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Abstract
This Article offers the first systematic attempt to measure the
development of shareholder protection in the United States across time.
Using three indices developed to measure the relative strength of
shareholder protection across nations, this Article evaluates numerically
the protections corporate and securities law have offered shareholders
from the beginning of the 20th century to the present day. It accomplishes
this by tracking the rights accorded to shareholders across time under
three important sources of corporate law: Delaware and Illinois and the
Model Business Corporation Act.
This Article’s novel study yields novel results. First, we find that the
protections afforded to shareholders by state corporation law have
decreased since 1900 but only modestly so. This indicates that, contrary
to the assumptions of many scholars, state competition in corporate law
has not significantly eroded shareholder rights. Second, after adding in
measures that count protections provided by federal as well as state law,
we find that shareholder protection actually improved over time. This
implies that federal intervention has played a crucial and perhaps
underappreciated role in shaping U.S. corporate law. Beyond its specific
findings, this Article illustrates how quantitative analysis of legal trends
provides scholars with valuable insights regarding fundamental questions
in corporate law.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article constitutes the first systematic attempt to measure the
development of shareholder protection in the United States across time.
The study is set against a background of strong presumptions concerning
both present levels of protection and trends over time. Corporate law
scholars tend to assume that shareholders in U.S. public companies are
poorly protected in relation to their peers in comparable countries. In a
2005 article, Professor Lucian Bebchuk argued in favor of increasing
shareholder power in U.S. corporations on the grounds that “the corporate
law system of the United States . . . stands out among the corporate law
systems of developed countries in how far it goes to restrict shareholder
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initiative and intervention.”1 Professor Martin Gelter suggested in 2009
that “U.S. corporate and securities law is highly unusual in the extent to
which it disenfranchises shareholders from both explicit and implicit
influence.”2 Professor Christopher Bruner, in a 2013 book contrasting
U.S. corporate governance arrangements with those in other common law
countries, indicated that among “[t]he defining attributes of U.S.
corporate law are the shareholders’ marginal role and very weak
governance powers.”3
Underlying this view that U.S. shareholder protection is relatively
weak is the assumption that the current situation is the product of a
decline in shareholder rights across time. For instance, Professor William
Roy observed in a 1997 book that since the rise of the industrial
corporation, “stockholders and directors have gone to battle over many
issues, and the directors have usually won.”4 Similarly, Professor Mary
Sullivan argued in 2007 that shareholders’ statutory rights were
substantially diminished between 1885 and 1930.5 Or as Professor Julian
Velasco noted, “[t]he history of corporate law has been one of increasing
flexibility for directors and decreasing rights for shareholders.”6
If shareholder protection has indeed eroded over time, the logical
culprit is the United States’ state-based system of corporate law.
Companies are incorporated under the laws of one of the fifty states rather
than under a federal statute, and a business can incorporate in a state other
than the one in which it is headquartered.7 States correspondingly can,
and at least to some extent do, compete for incorporation business by
altering their corporate laws to attract incorporations, with Delaware
being the clear winner.8 The regulatory competition that is a feature of
1. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV.
833, 848 (2005).
2. Martin Gelter, The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial Autonomy and
Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 129, 134
(2009).
3. CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD:
THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER 37 (2013).
4. WILLIAM G. ROY, SOCIALIZING CAPITAL: THE RISE OF THE LARGE INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION IN AMERICA 158 (1997).
5. Mary O’Sullivan, The Expansion of the U.S. Stock Market, 1885–1930: Historical
Facts and Theoretical Fashions, 8 ENTERPRISE & SOC’Y 489, 529 (2007),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1467222700006182.
6. Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV.
407, 409 (2006).
7. 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 3:2 (3d ed.
2010).
8. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk:
Reconsidering the Competition over Corporate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553, 554, 561 (2002);
Mark J. Roe, Is Delaware’s Corporate Law Too Big to Fail?, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 75, 76 (2008);
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U.S. corporate law has sparked a widespread and enduring debate among
corporate law scholars,9 with one study of leading law journals showing
that more than half of all articles on corporate law discussed the topic.10
There has been vigorous disagreement whether the “race” between the
states has been to the “bottom,” in the sense that states have competed by
adopting counterproductive manager-friendly laws, or to the “top,” in the
sense that states have competed by adopting laws that served investors’
interests.11 It has been generally accepted, though, that this race has
resulted in a net reduction in shareholders’ rights, either because states
have been cynically watering down existing shareholder protection to
appeal to managers—racing to the bottom—or because states have been
displacing superfluous or inefficient rules—racing to the top.12
While the general consensus has been that the Delaware-led
competition between the states in the corporate law realm has prompted
a substantial erosion of shareholder rights and thus shareholder
protection, there have been dissenting voices. For example, Professor
Walter Werner argued in 1977 that over the previous four decades,
“[s]hareholders’ legal rights within the corporation have been made

see also John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act, 87 IND. L.J.
1345, 1346, 1348 (2012).
9. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Trapped in a Metaphor: The Limited Implications of
Federalism for Corporate Governance, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 255, 257 (2009) (referring to
“corporate [law] literature’s singular emphasis on a race among states”); Lucian A. Bebchuk &
Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1794
(2006); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Democracy and Delaware: The Mysterious Race to the
Bottom/Top, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 381 (2005) (“Corporate law scholarship has focused
on the role of the states as competitive actors in producing corporate law.”); Marcel Kahan, The
State of State Competition for Incorporations 3 (European Corp. Governance Inst. Working Paper
Series in Law, Working Paper No. 263/2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2474658 (“The
competition by states for incorporations has long been the subject of extensive scholarship.”).
10. See Robert B. Ahdieh, The (Misunderstood) Genius of American Corporate Law, 77
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 730, 731–32 (2009) (indicating that in a search of articles published in
leading law reviews, almost three-quarters referred to topics relevant to regulatory competition).
11. Compare William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 701, 705 (1974) (arguing that there was a race to the bottom
regarding corporate law), with Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 275–76 (1977) (responding to Professor Cary’s
argument with what became known as the race-to-the-top hypothesis), and ROBERTA ROMANO,
THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 19–22 (1993) (providing support for the race-to-thetop hypothesis). For further discussion of this debate, see J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of
State Corporate Law in the Governance of Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 324
(2004); Roe, supra note 8, at 76–77.
12. Roe, supra note 8, at 76–77; see also Ahdieh, supra note 9, at 263 (indicating that a
leading critic of the “race to the bottom” view did not dispute the “observation of declining levels
of shareholder protection”).
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meaningful.”13 Professor Edward Herman suggested similarly in 1984
that “corporate standards of behavior and attention to the welfare of the
shareholders are substantially greater . . . than they were in 1925.”14
Bringing the story up to date, activist hedge funds have successfully
challenged boards of publicly traded companies in recent years,
suggesting shareholders are hardly weaklings under U.S. corporate law.
In 2014, the New York Times noted that these shareholder insurgents
“have amassed huge war chests, to take on some of the biggest names in
corporate America—and win more often than not.”15
Werner and Herman both drew attention to federal securities
legislation, first introduced in the mid-1930s,16 to buttress their claims
that shareholder protection had become more robust during the 20th
century.17 More recently, recognition of the federal dimension has
fundamentally shifted the terms of debate on the merits of regulatory
competition in the corporate law realm. In particular, Professor Mark Roe
reframed the discourse by arguing that the federal government’s actions
on the corporate governance front had done more to shape Delaware
corporate law than had potential competition from other states.18
Roe’s contribution, while insightful and influential, raises at least two
significant, and as yet unanswered, questions. First, has the federal
contribution to the shape of U.S. corporate law in fact been pivotal or
only a side-show? Second, assuming that competition between states has
over time diminished the rights corporate statutes provide to
shareholders, has federal intervention bolstered shareholder protection
sufficiently to cancel out moves in the other direction at the state level?

13. Walter Werner, Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reform: Berle and Means
Reconsidered, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 388, 398 (1977).
14. Edward S. Herman, The Limits of the Market as a Discipline in Corporate Governance,
9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 530, 538 (1984).
15. Michael J. de la Merced & Alexandra Stevenson, Sotheby’s Yields to Hedge Fund
Mogul and Allies, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (May 6, 2014, 11:48 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/05/sothebys-and-loeb-end-fight-over-board/.
16. See Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012)); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp).
17. Herman, supra note 14, at 531, 538; Werner, supra note 13, at 398.
18. Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 591–93 (2003)
[hereinafter Roe, Delaware’s Competition]; Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2491, 2493–94 (2005). On the nature of Professor Roe’s contribution to the discourse, see
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1749, 1767 (2006); Note, The Case for Federal Threats in Corporate Governance, 118
HARV. L. REV. 2726, 2726 (2005).
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With respect to the first question, Roe argues that “[t]here is a large
federal presence in corporate law,”19 but this claim has been contested.
For instance, Professor Roberta Romano has challenged what she has
referred to as the “federal supremacy hypothesis,” saying that the
dynamics of corporate law in the United States can still be explained best
by the working of competition between states.20 Professors Marcel Kahan
and Ed Rock struck a middle ground in a 2005 article, suggesting that the
federal “threat” to Delaware is only potent at moments when, due to the
political climate, federal lawmakers can reap populist political dividends
by supporting corporate governance reform.21
With the second question, again there is disagreement. According to
some observers, the interaction between state-based corporate law and
periodic federal intervention provides shareholders with ample and
appropriate protection. Professor Brett McDonnell has suggested that
under many circumstances, the United States’ mixed system of state and
federal corporate law produces better results than a pure state or pure
national system would yield.22 Leo E. Strine, Jr., Chief Justice of the
Delaware Supreme Court, maintains that investors benefit from a
combination of Delaware courts enforcing fiduciary duties expertly and
the federal government vigorously policing laws mandating disclosure to
investors.23
Other scholars are less sanguine. Bebchuk and Assaf Hamdani argue
that, even when federal intervention is taken into account, “regulatory
competition tends to produce insufficient investor protection.”24
Professor J. Robert Brown, Jr., maintains similarly that “neither the states
nor the federal government adequately regulates the behavior of officers
and directors.”25
Empirical analysis of the development of U.S. corporate law across
time could help to resolve these controversies. As Professor Todd
19. Mark J. Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L.
1, 33 (2009).
20. Roberta Romano, Is Regulatory Competition a Problem or Irrelevant for Corporate
Governance?, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 212, 213, 223 (2005).
21. Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate
Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1576 (2005).
22. Brett H. McDonnell, Recent Skirmishes in the Battle over Corporate Voting and
Governance, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 349, 353 (2007); see also Kahan & Rock, supra note 21, at
1622 (“[Federal] regulations help ward-off crises and thus provide a lightning rod for a populist
backlash that could produce severe harm to Delaware’s position as the creator of our de facto
national corporate law.”).
23. Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the
New Challenges We (and Europe) Face, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673, 686 (2005).
24. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 9, at 1796.
25. Brown, supra note 11, at 320–21.
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Henderson has suggested, empirical research could bring “the debate
down to the level of the real-world merits and applicability
of . . . conflicting visions of corporate law.”26 Nevertheless, until now
only a tiny handful of studies have attempted to measure quantitatively
changes in U.S. corporate law over time, and those studies have typically
sought to measure the pace of change rather than to quantify the level of
protection afforded to shareholders.27 This Article breaks new ground
with a pioneering empirical analysis that provides insights concerning the
evolution of shareholder rights across time. It does so by measuring the
evolution of shareholder protection from 1899 to the present day using
“leximetric” tools developed to engage in quantitative measurement of
corporate law.28
To execute our historically-based leximetric analysis of the
development of shareholder protection we draw upon methodologies
developed by academics researching comparative corporate governance.
In particular, we rely on three indices constructed to measure aspects of
corporate law across national borders: (1) a six-element “anti-director
rights index” (ADRI); (2) an “anti-self-dealing index” (ASDI); and (3) a
ten-variable shareholder protection index constructed by an academic
team associated with the Cambridge, U.K.-based Centre for Business
Research (CBR SPI).29 We use each of these indices to measure
shareholder protection under three different corporate law regimes:
Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Business Corporations Act (Model
Act)—the model statute promulgated by the Committee on Corporate
Laws of the Section of Business Law of the American Bar Association
and adopted in whole or substantial part by more than thirty states.30
To anticipate, our empirical analysis casts doubt on some aspects of
the received wisdom concerning regulatory competition in the corporate
law realm while affirming other aspects. Some caution is warranted in
26. M. Todd Henderson, Two Visions of Corporate Law, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 708, 713
(2009).
27. See Brian R. Cheffins, Steven A. Bank & Harwell Wells, Law and History by Numbers:
Use, but with Care, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1739, 1742–43 (discussing William J. Carney, The
Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715 (1998) and Roberta Romano, The States as
a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON
REG. 209 (2006)).
28. Priya P. Lele & Mathias Siems, Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric Approach, 7 J.
CORP. L. STUD. 17, 18 (2007). The term “leximetrics,” described as the “systematic quantitative”
analysis of law, was coined in a 2003 working paper by Robert Cooter & Tom Ginsburg,
Leximetrics: Why the Same Laws Are Longer in Some Countries than Others (UNIV. OF ILL. LAW
& ECON., Working Paper No. LE03-012, 2003), http://ssrn.com/abstract=456520.
29. Mathias Siems, Shareholder Protection Around the World (Leximetric II), 33 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 111, 116–19 (2008).
30. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
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drawing inferences from the results. As we have acknowledged in prior
related work, deploying leximetrics to measure U.S. corporate law
accurately is challenging, particularly when one goes back through
time.31 Nevertheless, leximetric analysis can generate sufficiently
accurate scores to identify quantitatively key trends.32 Correspondingly,
this Article’s empirical analysis is a valuable benchmarking exercise that
provides novel insights into the development of shareholder protection
over time.
Part I of this Article sets the scene for our leximetric analysis. It
explains why we chose the jurisdictions we did. It also describes our
leximetric methodology, doing so in part by summarizing who makes law
under the United States’ system of corporate law federalism.
The leximetric analysis occurs in Part II. Here we identify formally
the hypotheses we test, we set out the present-day ADRI, ASDI, and CBR
SPI scores for Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Act and conclude by
describing our historical results. Our core findings are that state law
protections of shareholders have diminished since 1900, but not
substantially, and that shareholder protection overall increased over time
due to a federally prompted surge in shareholder rights.33
With respect to state law trends, ADRI scores, which are governed
purely by state law, drop over time but generally only modestly. The
downward trend is what would be anticipated, given that competition
between states on the corporate law front has reputedly eroded
shareholder rights. On the other hand, the modest rate of change indicates
that there was not much of a “race” between states in the period covered.
When we take into account federal law trends using the ASDI and the
CBR SPI, federal intervention was not only significant, but, contrary to
what one would expect if vigorous state competition was eroding
shareholder rights generally, more than offset any erosion of shareholder
protection at the state level. Specifically, whereas the state-law-based
ADRI scores of Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Act dropped—albeit
modestly—from 1899 onward, the aggregate ASDI and CBR SPI scores
for these jurisdictions, which measure aspects of federal as well as state
law, increased over time, dramatically in the case of the CBR SPI.
Moreover, after taking into account federal reforms introduced either
directly by the federal government or by national stock exchanges
working in tandem with federal regulators, the level of shareholder
protection the United States currently offers is—contrary to what

31. Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at 1763.
32. Id.
33. See Brian R. Cheffins, Steven A. Bank & Harwell Wells, Questioning ‘Law and
Finance’: U.S. Stock Market Development, 1930–70, 55 BUS. HIST. 598, 605 (2013) (anticipating
these findings in part).
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observers such as Professors Bebchuk, Bruner, and Gelter imply—quite
high by global standards.
Part III offers a robustness check of our findings. One point we make
in this Part is that while the indices we focus on have only been developed
over the past two decades they provide a suitable departure point for
analyzing trends extending back more than a century. Part III
demonstrates this in part by using as a benchmark a fourteen-point list of
shareholder rights promulgated in 1929, thereby countering the
possibility that the variables in the indices we use are too modern to rely
upon for historical analysis. Part III also identifies key changes to state
law occurring during the 20th century to ascertain whether reform
displaced the protection of shareholders in fundamental ways not
captured by our indices or by the 1929 fourteen-point list. The analysis
suggests, corroborating what the indices reveal about trends concerning
state law, that while there was erosion of some forms of shareholder
protection arising under state law, there was no decisive curtailing of
shareholder rights. It seems that if the rights corporate law provided to
shareholders were ever reduced markedly, this occurred primarily as the
19th century drew to a close, rather than continuing during the 20th
century.
This Article concludes by underscoring the contributions it makes to
theoretical debates concerning corporate law. It also acknowledges that it
is left to others to gauge the normative implications of the trends
identified.
I. METHODOLOGY
Part I sets the scene for this Article’s leximetric analysis. Sections I.A
and I.B explain why we selected the indices we deploy and the
jurisdictions on which we focus. Section I.C explains the coding
protocols associated with the indices we deploy, and Section I.D provides
an introduction to the variables associated with each index. Section I.E
describes the types of rules taken into account with the scoring of each
index. Section I.F canvasses the relevance of who makes the rules that
potentially could be taken into account.
A. Selecting the Indices
In the mid-1990s, as corporate governance first emerged as a topic of
international interest,34 academics began to develop indices to quantify
the protection the corporate laws of various countries offered investors.
These efforts have continued to the present day. Here we deploy three
34. On the relevant chronology, see generally Brian R. Cheffins, The History of Corporate
Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 46, 56–58 (Mike Wright,
Donald S. Siegel, Kevin Keasey & Igor Filatotchev eds., 2013).
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different indices originally developed for cross-country comparison to
examine the development of U.S. corporate law over time.
There are several reasons we chose to rely on existing indices rather
than constructing an entirely new one. First, there is familiarity. Most
readers likely already know of one or more of the indices used, which
will increase the accessibility of the results. Second, drawing upon
existing indices means this Article “speaks the same language” as the
modern literature on quantitative analysis of corporate law. Thus, future
scholars will be able to compare readily our historically-oriented results
with those for a wide range of present-day jurisdictions. Third, relying on
existing indices avoids the distraction of defending the effectiveness of a
new index and maintains focus on correct historical coding rather than
index comparison.
The first of the three indices we deploy is the six element anti-director
rights index. It was constructed in the mid-1990s by financial economists
Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert
Vishny.35 The second is the anti-self-dealing index which La Porta,
López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer developed in the mid-2000s with Simeon
Djankov. It focuses on the regulation of transactions between a company
and those who control it.36 The third is the CBR SPI, a ten-variable
shareholder protection index Professor Mathias Siems constructed in the
late 2000s with the Cambridge, U.K.-based Centre for Business
Research.37
Combining discussion of these indices risks deployment of a slew of
acronyms referring to both indices and authors. At the risk of some
confusion to the reader, this Article uses various acronyms because they
have become standard in the scholarly literature. To clarify matters, the
key acronyms are set out in Table 1. Drawing the elements together,
LLSV produced the ADRI, DLLS produced the ASDI, and Siems–CBR
produced the CBR SPI.
Table 1: List of Acronyms
Index or Author Group
Anti-Director Rights Index
Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes,
Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny
Anti-Self-Dealing Index

Acronym
ADRI
LLSV
ASDI

35. The ADRI was initially fully deployed in a published paper in Rafael La Porta,
Florencio López-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny (“LLSV”), Law and Finance,
106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998). A working paper version was distributed in 1996 as part of the
NBER Working Paper Series: http://www.nber.org/papers/w5661.pdf.
36. Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The
Law and Economics of Self-Dealing, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 430, 442 (2008) [hereinafter DLLS].
37. Siems, supra note 29, at 116–19.
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Mathias Siems and the CBR academic team that
constructed the CBR SPI
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DLLS
CBR SPI
Siems–CBR

Why did we choose each index? With the ADRI, its wide acceptance
strongly influenced us. The publication of the original ADRI in a 1998
article sparked the development of a rapidly burgeoning “law and
finance” literature oriented around quantitative comparative analysis
which aims to trace the relationship between nations’ laws and legal
institutions, on the one hand, and corporate governance outcomes, on the
other.38 In the law and finance realm, the ADRI has achieved the greatest
prominence with respect to the measurement of corporate law.39 As of
2010, over one hundred academic papers had used the ADRI to test
theories concerning the interaction between law and markets.40
Correspondingly, for the quantitative analysis of the historical
development of U.S. corporate law, the ADRI was an obvious metric to
deploy.
Relying solely on the ADRI, however, could yield a seriously
incomplete picture. This index fails to take into account numerous key
corporate law topics, including powers shareholders have to remove
directors, the scope of shareholders’ managerial powers, and the legality
of takeover defenses.41 It is hardly surprising that the ADRI is not
comprehensive, given that it only has six components. This problem is
compounded, however, because of the component selection process.
Several years after the ADRI was first developed, three of its creators, La
Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, writing in tandem with Djankov,
conceded that the ADRI was “based on an ad hoc collection of

38. See generally John Armour, Simon Deakin, Priya Lele & Mathias Siems, How Do Legal
Rules Evolve? Evidence from a Cross-Country Comparison of Shareholder, Creditor, and Worker
Protection, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 579, 582–92 (2009) (giving an overview of this literature and its
popularity).
39. Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, The Elusive Quest for Global Corporate
Governance Standards, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1276 (2009) (stating that the ADRI was,
“[a]mong academic researchers, the most influential metric for evaluating governance
arrangements worldwide”).
40. Holger Spamann, The “Antidirector Rights Index” Revisited, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 467,
468 (2010), http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/content/23/2/467.full.pdf.
41. Lele & Siems, supra note 28, at 20–21; see also Detlev Vagts, Comparative Company
Law—The New Wave, in FESTSCHRIFT FÜR JEAN NICOLAS DRUEY 595, 601 (Rainer J. Schweizer,
Herbert Burkert & Urs Gasser eds., 2002).
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variables.”42 Thus, the ADRI in isolation is a less than ideal proxy for the
level of protection corporate law has provided for shareholders over time.
Djankov, La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (DLLS), when
they criticized the original ADRI, were putting forward a second index
designed to measure shareholder protections—the ASDI. There are good
reasons why the ASDI should be part of a project to code shareholder
protection historically.43 First, DLLS explicitly proffered this index as a
superior alternative to the ADRI, saying that the ASDI dealt “with
corporate self-dealing in a more theoretically grounded way.”44 Second,
in empirical tests DLLS ran on the relationship between stock market
development and corporate law, the ASDI delivered more robust results
than the ADRI.45 Third, the ASDI has proven popular in its own right
among those carrying out empirical law and finance research, and it could
indeed be supplanting the ADRI as the most accepted numerical measure
of the quality of corporate law.46
Whatever the ASDI’s merits in comparison with the ADRI, because
of its narrowness the ASDI is, in isolation, an insufficient measure of
shareholder protection for this Article’s purposes. The ASDI addresses a
solitary legal topic: the regulation of related-party transactions involving
a company and its dominant shareholder, who is also a director.47 The
underlying scenario is a classic example of the sort of conflict of interest
that can bedevil corporations.48 Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to be
confident that regulation of this particular topic will be broadly
representative of the level of protection corporation law affords to
shareholders.
Because the ASDI’s narrow scope partly compromises its utility, the
broad coverage of the CBR SPI provides a compelling rationale for using
it as the third index. The CBR SPI encompasses ten variables, selected
by the index’s creators partly because the variables represented the full
range of shareholder protections used in the countries coded.49 The wide

42. DLLS, supra note 36, at 432.
43. For a more detailed analysis, see generally Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at
1751–52.
44. DLLS, supra note 36, at 432.
45. Id. at 456–61.
46. Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at 1752.
47. Id. at 1741.
48. Mary A. Jacobson, Interested Director Transactions and the (Equivocal) Effects of
Shareholder Ratification, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 981, 986–87 (1996); Eric G. Orlinsky, Corporate
Opportunity Doctrine and Interested Director Transactions: A Framework for Analysis in an
Attempt to Restore Predictability, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 451, 453 (1999).
49. John Armour et al., Shareholder Protection and Stock Market Development: An
Empirical Test of the Legal Origins Hypothesis, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 343, 353–55 (2009);
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range of data taken into account by the CBR SPI potentially makes it a
more reliable proxy for shareholder protection levels than either the
ADRI or ASDI.
Although the range of issues the CBR SPI addresses is wider than
those covered by the ADRI or ASDI, it would be imprudent to use the
CBR SPI as the exclusive measure of corporate law for this Article’s
historically-related leximetric exercise. One consideration is that,
whatever the CBR SPI’s merits might be as a corporate law index, it is
not as well-known and has not been as influential as the ADRI and
ASDI.50 Also, the CBR SPI’s designers selected variables thought to form
the core of international corporate governance “best practice” between
1995 and 2005.51 In so doing, they intentionally focused on a period when
proposals to strengthen shareholder protection were high on the policy
agenda in numerous countries and deliberately biased the selection of
variables in favor of those expected to exhibit a relatively high degree of
change during the decade selected.52 No explicit equivalent “present-day”
bias affects the ADRI and ASDI, meaning that for a historically oriented
study such as the one in this Article, they provide a useful cross-check
against this feature of the CBR SPI.
Minimal overlap between the three indices reinforces the utility of
each as a cross-check against the others. For example, neither the ADRI
nor the CBR SPI explicitly addresses rules governing transactions
between a corporation and one of its directors or dominant shareholders,
which means these indices cover different ground than the ASDI. There
is overlap between the ADRI and the CBR SPI in that they both take into
account the extent to which corporate law facilitates shareholder voting
by way of proxies and the degree to which the law protects against
minority shareholder oppression, defined largely in terms of the

Siems, supra note 29, at 116–19. The initial CBR SPI was a highly detailed sixty-variable index
coded for five countries. Lele & Siems, supra note 28, at 23, 45–49.
50. The number of citations for each of the papers where the indices were initially deployed
provides an admittedly crude illustration of this point. See Search Results for LLSV, Law and
Finance, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=La+Porta%2C+Lopez-de-Silan
e%2C+Schleifer%2C+Vishny%2C+Law+and+Finance&btnG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C10 (last
visited Oct. 17, 2016) (17,321 citations); Search Results for DLLS, The Law and Economics of
Self-dealing, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, http://scholar.google.com/scholar?q=Djankov%2C+La+Porta%
2C+Lopez-de-Silanes%2C+Shleifer%2C+The+Law+and+Economics+of+Self-Dealing&btnG=
&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C10 (last visited Oct. 17, 2016) (2286 citations); Search Results for Lele &
Siems, Shareholder Protection: A Leximetric Approach, GOOGLE SCHOLAR, http://scholar.google.
com/scholar?q=Lele%2C+Siems%2C+Shareholder+Protection%3A+A+Leximetric+Approach&bt
nG=&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C10 (last visited Oct. 17, 2016) (195 citations).
51. Armour et al., supra note 49, at 355, 374.
52. See id. at 353, 355.
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procedure governing shareholder derivative suits.53 However, a majority
of the six topics the ADRI addresses are not components of the CBR
SPI.54 Similarly, the bulk of CBR SPI elements lack an ADRI
counterpart.55
In sum, each index used, in isolation, has drawbacks as a mechanism
for measuring the historical development of U.S. corporate law.
Nevertheless, taken together, the three indices canvass a wide range of
mechanisms that afford protection to shareholders and collectively
should offer a sufficiently representative picture of shareholder rights to
allow for a fruitful historical analysis. This may be the best that can be
achieved given the tools at hand. A more exhaustive empirical analysis
of corporate law developments impacting shareholder rights is unlikely
to be feasible because fully “[e]valuating the substance of state
corporation laws [is] a daunting task.”56
B. Selecting the Legal Regimes
When seeking to ascertain trends concerning shareholder protection
in the United States, it would be unwise to restrict the analysis to one
state. As William Roy has observed, historically “[s]tockholders’ rights
were actively protected in some states and ignored in others.”57 Yet
surveying all fifty states would be extremely difficult. Coding corporate
law using the three chosen indices is a labor-intensive process involving
not only careful research of the applicable law, but also difficult judgment
calls on appropriate coding. The challenges multiply with historically
oriented analysis because tracking down relevant statutory provisions,
administrative rules, and case law back to 1900 is often far from
straightforward.58 We therefore restricted our analysis to three legal
53. The variables comprising both indices are identified individually below. See infra
Section III.C. LLSV took account empirically of the regulation of multiple voting rights attached
to shares—an element of the CBR SPI—but they did not treat this form of regulation as part of
the ADRI. See LLSV, supra note 35, at 1126–27.
54. The elements of the ADRI are set out below. See infra Table 2. To anticipate, the
components of the ADRI not addressed in the CBR SPI are the rights individual shareholders have
to call shareholder meetings, the ability of companies to block share transfers immediately prior
to shareholder meetings, the fostering of a director election system known as cumulative voting,
and “preemptive” rights shareholders can be vested with in relation to the issuance of shares.
55. The CBR SPI components are summarized below. See infra Table 3. The CBR SPI
components not part of the ADRI are the regulation of shares with multiple voting rights attached,
requirements concerning the appointment of independent directors, and rules forcing shareholders
to make a takeover offer after acquiring a large minority stake—a “mandatory bid.”
56. Wells M. Engledow, Handicapping the Corporate Law Race, 28 J. CORP. L. 143, 153
(2002).
57. ROY, supra note 4, at 156.
58. See Siems, supra note 29, at 116 (“[T]he compilation and coding of legal rules across
time is very complex and time-consuming.”). See generally Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note
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regimes, namely Delaware, the Model Act, and Illinois. These three
should nevertheless collectively provide a highly representative sampling
of trends affecting U.S. corporate law.
Delaware was an obvious choice, given that, for nearly a century,
more publicly traded companies have been incorporated in Delaware than
in any other state.59 The Model Act was also a clear choice, given that it
is a highly influential model statute adopted substantially in more than
thirty states.60 Due to the high degree of uniformity between the Model
Act and the corporate law statutes of numerous states, it has been referred
to as “the backbone of U.S. statutory corporate law.”61
We chose Illinois primarily to foster continuity in the analysis. We
scored Delaware’s corporate law back to 1899, the year when the state
first enacted a new general incorporation statute intended to attract
incorporation business.62 The first Model Act was not produced until
1950, however,63 so we needed a proxy for state law developments
occurring before the Model Act’s promulgation. We chose Illinois
because the Illinois Business Corporations Act of 1933 was the primary
precedent for the 1950 Model Act—partly because the principal drafters
of the initial Model Act were from Illinois.64 Moreover, the 1933 Illinois
legislation was considered to be innovative and influential in its own
right65 and, seemingly contrary to the 20th century trend of states
reducing shareholder rights in corporate law, was ostensibly structured to
give shareholders more protections than the laws of Delaware and other
27, at 1748–51, 1759–63 (providing examples of the challenges involved with coding
historically).
59. Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 33, at 605.
60. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN., intro. xix (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013) (stating that thirty-two
states had adopted all or substantially all of the provisions of the current Model Act and four other
states had statutes based on the 1969 version).
61. Mark D. West, The Puzzling Divergence of Corporate Law: Evidence and Explanations
from Japan and the United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 527, 548 (2001); see also STEPHEN M.
BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 9 (2d ed. 2009) (“The most important alternative to Delaware law
is the American Bar Association’s Model Business Corporation Act.”); Michael P. Dooley &
Michael D. Goldman, Some Comparisons Between the Model Business Corporation Act and the
Delaware General Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 737, 738 (2001) (referring to “[t]he relatively
greater success of the Model Act in terms of adoptions”).
62. Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 33, at 605.
63. COX & HAZEN, supra note 7, § 2:5, at 140 (“The Model Act first appeared in completed
form in 1950.”); Romano, supra note 27, at 236 n.73 (2006) (“[T]he 1950 revision of [a 1946]
draft statute is now considered the first Model Act.”).
64. Romano, supra note 27, at 236–37 n.73; West, supra note 61, at 543; Cf. Jeffrey M.
Gorris, Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Leo E. Strine, Delaware Corporate Law and the Model
Business Corporation Act: A Study in Symbiosis, 74 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 109
(acknowledging the Illinois influence but stating that the drafters used Delaware law as their
primary departure point).
65. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 7 § 2:5, at 140; West, supra note 61, at 542–43.
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“chartermongering” states.66 As with Delaware, we score Illinois law
back to 1899.
C. Coding Protocol—In General
For each of the three indices we have deployed the same coding
protocol to score shareholder protection going back through time. We
began with the present-day score for each of the three corporate law
regimes—Delaware, the Model Act, and Illinois. Having ascertained the
present-day scores for each, we worked backwards to identify changes to
the law that would have caused the score for any of the relevant variables
to move up or down.
With one of our indices, the ADRI, our efforts were complicated by
the fact that it has been reworked since its initial deployment. The ADRI
that LLSV originally promulgated was significantly rescored not once but
twice, by DLLS in a 2008 article and by Professor Holger Spamann for a
project culminating in an article published the following year.67 The
rationale for recoding and the key differences between the scoring
methodologies for each version of this index are discussed below.68 For
present purposes, it suffices to say that we took the scorings by DLLS
and Spamann as our departure point and did not take LLSV’s analysis
into account.
In determining present-day scores for the ADRI, ASDI and CBR SPI,
Delaware was the obvious place to start because reliable present-day
66. Harwell Wells, The Modernization of Corporation Law, 1920–1940, 11 U. PA. J. BUS.
L. 573, 576, 594 (2009). While the fact that Illinois has reputedly placed more emphasis on
shareholder rights than other states helps to explain the focus on this jurisdiction, continuity with
the Model Act was the key consideration. If the primary concern was to trace developments in a
state with a reputation for protecting shareholders, California would be a better choice. A
significant proportion of the largest U.S. companies are incorporated under California law; as of
the mid-2000s, twenty percent of Fortune 500 companies were incorporated in California
compared with sixty percent incorporated in Delaware. Matt Stevens, Note, Internal Affairs
Doctrine: California Versus Delaware in a Fight for the Right to Regulate Foreign Corporations,
48 B.C. L. REV. 1047, 1049 (2007). Also, California has long had a reputation for having corporate
law that offered significant protection to shareholders. See Andrew J. Collins, Comment, Choice
of Corporate Domicile: California or Delaware, 13 U.S.F. L. REV. 103, 106 (1977); Francis G.
Wilmarth, Comment, Choice of a Corporate Domicile, 49 CAL. L. REV. 518, 523–27 (1961). On
the other hand, California has never been influential as a source of corporate law nationally in the
same way as Delaware and the Model Act. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’
Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383, 396 (2003) (“California appears unable to
‘sell’ its corporate law system to any significant number of out-of-state firms . . . .”); Guhan
Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the
“Race” Debate and Antitakeover Overreaching, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1795, 1854 (2002)
(remarking upon California’s “poor showing in the market for corporate charters”).
67. DLLS, Law and Economics, supra note 36, at 461; Spamann, supra note 40, at 477.
68. See infra Section I.E.
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scoring for Delaware was readily available for all three indices. The
ADRI was already scored for Delaware because the authors who
developed or reworked that index—LLSV, DLLS and Spamann—had
taken Delaware as representative of U.S. corporate law.69 The ASDI and
CBR SPI were also already scored for Delaware because both DLLS and
Siems and his Centre for Business Research co-authors likewise treated
Delaware as their proxy for U.S. corporate law.70
With Delaware’s present-day scores we drew verbatim from the work
of DLLS, Spamann, and Siems–CBR. Since we adopted the scoring from
each source without variation, even if we had qualms about how a
particular variable was scored, we refrained from recoding. We scored
Illinois and the Model Act ourselves, although whenever the applicable
rule in these jurisdictions was substantially similar to Delaware’s, we
used the Delaware coding of DLLS, Spamann, and Siems–CBR to
promote consistency.
Given the extensive borrowing from DLLS, Spamann, and Siems–
CBR, one might assume that ascertaining present-day scores would be a
straightforward exercise. On the contrary, identifying the suitable scores
posed various challenges that influenced the approach taken with
historical scoring. The remaining Sections in this Part illustrate that point
in the course of summarizing the key elements of the ADRI, the ASDI,
and the CBR SPI and identifying the sources of law that need to be taken
into account when coding shareholder protection using each index.
D. The Relevant Variables
To ascertain appropriate present-day coding for the ADRI, ASDI and
CBR SPI, we identified each index’s variables and each variable’s basic
scoring regime. This Section describes each index in detail.
1. ADRI
The ADRI, which was constructed and initially deployed by LLSV
in a 1998 Journal of Political Economy article to compare the protection
afforded by corporate law to shareholders in forty-nine countries,71 has
six variables, each described briefly in Table 2.

69. DLLS, supra note 36, at 454; LLSV, supra note 35, at 1119; Spamann, supra note 40,
at 472 n.12.
70. DLLS, supra note 36, at 442 (ASDI); Siems, supra note 29, at 120 (CBR SPI).
71. LLSV, supra note 35, at 1147–49.
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Table 2: ADRI Elements
ADRI Variable
Vote by Proxy
Allowed
No Block
Cumulative
Voting
Oppressed
Minority
Preemptive
Rights
Ability to Call
General Meeting

Definition
The ability of shareholders to mail in a proxy vote rather
than to vote only in person at a meeting of the
shareholders.72
The absence of a requirement that shareholders intending to
vote their shares at a shareholder meeting deposit those
shares before the meeting, rendering them nontransferable.73
The availability of cumulative voting, which permits
minority shareholders to “bundle” their votes and thereby
increases the likelihood that they can elect their
representatives to the board of directors.74
The availability of mechanisms offering relief to minority
shareholders who have been oppressed or unfairly
prejudiced.75
Rules obliging a company to give existing shareholders a
right of first refusal when issuing new shares.76
The ability of shareholders owning ten percent or more of a
company’s shares to call an extraordinary shareholders’
meeting.77

LLSV awarded jurisdictions either “0” or “1” for each variable, with
a higher cumulative score for a country signaling a more shareholderfriendly legal regime.78 The maximum score any country could receive
was “6,” although “5” in fact was the highest score that LLSV awarded.79
When DLLS recoded the ADRI for forty-nine countries for the purposes
of their 2008 article, they scored the law as of 2003.80 The highest score
they awarded remained “5.”81 The DLLS recoding, however, often
changed the scores awarded to individual countries for particular
variables, with the correlation with the original LLSV coding being
0.60.82 Also, while LLSV scored each ADRI variable as either “0” or “1,”

72. Id. at 1127.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1128.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. See id.
80. DLLS, supra note 36, at 432.
81. Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Law
and Economics of Self-Dealing: Data, HARVARD UNIV., Revised Antidir tab (2008), http://scholar.harv
ard.edu/files/shleifer/files/data_for_web.xls?m=1360042200 [hereinafter DLLS, Data] (showing that
nine countries were awarded a score of “5”).
82. DLLS, supra note 36, at 455.
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DLLS allowed a score of “0.5” for the oppressed minority shareholder
variable where this improved the accuracy of coding.83
2. ASDI
For DLLS the primary purpose of their 2008 article was not to recode
the ADRI but rather to deploy a new measure of corporate law, the ASDI,
for which they assessed the law of seventy-two countries.84 The departure
point for coding the ASDI is a hypothetical transaction implicating selfdealing.85 This transaction involves Buyer Co., a publicly traded food
manufacturer of which a Mr. James is both a director and sixty-percent
shareholder.86 Following a proposal by Mr. James, Buyer Co. agrees to
purchase an unused fleet of trucks from Seller Co., a privately held
retailer of which Mr. James is a ninety-percent shareholder.87 Though all
required approvals were obtained and all required disclosures made,
Buyer Co. shareholders sue on Buyer Co.’s behalf the interested parties
and the body that approved the transaction.88
To measure the law governing their hypothetical self-dealing
transaction, DLLS compiled two anti-self-dealing indices, one measuring
public enforcement—fines and other criminal sanctions—and the other
measuring private enforcement—civil remedies.89 They evaluated public
enforcement by assessing whether Mr. James and the approving parties
could be fined or imprisoned as a result of what had occurred. 90 Though
we have investigated how scoring under the public enforcement index
developed over time we do not report the results here.91 This is because
the public enforcement index has attracted considerably less interest than
the private enforcement index, due partly to only the latter index being
correlated in a meaningful way with measures of stock market
development.92
The ASDI private enforcement index is made up of two subindices,
one addressing ex ante private control of self-dealing and the other ex
post.93 The ex ante index, which focuses on regulation of the process by
which the sale of the trucks could be validated, deals with requirements
83. Id. at 455 tbl.9.
84. Id. at 432.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 433.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 435.
90. Id. at 436.
91. For a discussion of the trends with the public enforcement index, see generally Cheffins,
Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at 1754.
92. DLLS, supra note 36, at 451.
93. Id. at 434–35 tbl.1.
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for advance disclosure of the proposed transaction by Mr. James and
Buyer Co. as well as for an independent review of the transaction by a
financial expert or auditor.94 The ex post index, which measures the ease
with which minority shareholders of Buyer Co. could establish potential
wrongdoing in the courts after the transaction had been entered into, deals
with requirements Buyer Co. would face to disclose the transaction,
standing to sue, burden of proof, and access to evidence.95
As with the ADRI variables, the variables in the ASDI private
enforcement index are scored between “0” and “1.”96 In some instances,
such as with a requirement for an independent review, “0” and “1” are
the only possible scores.97 More often, allowance is made for the
possibility of intermediate scores, with the range usually limited to “0,”
“0.5,” and “1.”98 For instance, with the advance disclosures Mr. James
had to make for validation of the hypothetical transaction to be possible,
a country would score “0” if no disclosure was required, “0.5” if only the
conflict of interest had to be disclosed, and “1” if all material facts had to
be divulged.99
3. CBR SPI
The ten-variable CBR SPI is the third and final index we deploy.
Siems–CBR initially deployed the CBR-SPI to score corporate law in
twenty countries from 1995 to 2005,100 and then subsequently used it to
score corporate law in thirty countries from 1990 to 2013.101 As shown
in Table 3, the index addresses five basic categories, each associated with
two of the ten variables.102

94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Siems, supra note 29, at 116; Armour et al., supra note 49, at 353.
101. Dionysia Katelouzou & Mathias Siems, Disappearing Paradigms in Shareholder
Protection: Leximetric Evidence for 30 Countries, 1990–2013, 15 J. CORP. L. STUD. 127, 129–30
(2015); Mathias M. Siems, The Leximetric Research on Shareholder Protection, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON SHAREHOLDER POWER (Jennifer Hill G. & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015).
102. Siems, supra note 29, at 116–19.
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Table 3: CBR SPI Elements
CBR SPI Category

Variables
Shareholders’ right to vote collectively on
sale of the company’s assets.

Shareholder Power at Shareholder
Meetings

Shareholder Voting

Minority shareholders’ rights to
require that that an item be put on a
shareholder meeting agenda.103
Fostering effective shareholder voting by
making it possible for proxies to be sent by
mail and by requiring the use of “two way”
proxies that give a shareholder the
possibility of voting “yes” or “no.”
Regulation of shares with multiple voting
rights.104
Regulation of board composition in the form
of independent director requirements.

Encouraging Directors to Take Shareholder
Interests into Account

Legal Actions Minority Shareholders Can
File

Change of Corporate Control Protection

Rules regarding shareholder dismissal of
directors before the expiration of their
term.105
Minority shareholders’ ability to enforce
breaches of duty by way of derivative suits.
Shareholders’ ability to challenge
shareholder resolutions.106
Imposing on a shareholder who
acquires a large stake in a
corporation an obligation to offer to
buy the remaining shares.
Disclosure requirements for acquirers of
large-share ownership stakes.107

Consistent with the other indices, each CBR SPI variable is scored on
a range between “0” and “1.”108 Like the revised ADRI and the ASDI,
the CBR SPI forsakes strict binary “0” and “1” coding. 109 The CBR SPI
indeed goes further to accommodate intermediate scoring, with the
intention being to provide a more accurate picture of the law.110 Although
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 119.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 116–19.
Id. at 120.
Id.
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the revised ADRI and the ASDI permit non-binary options only when
explicitly identified, such as “0,” “0.5,” and “1,” those coding the CBR
SPI were prepared to give a wide range of intermediate scores for every
variable.111 For instance, while the description of the CBR SPI variable
dealing with independent directors indicates that the scoring options are
“1” if at least half of the board must be independent directors, “0.5” if
25% of the board must be independent, and “0” otherwise,112 Siems–CBR
awarded China 0.4 for 2002 and 0.6 for 2003 to 2005.113
E. Which Types of Rules Qualify?
When deciding how to score legal rules going back through time, we
had to take into account the form those rules took. Corporate law rules
fall into three basic categories: mandatory; default or presumptive
(applicable unless there has been a waiver or other form of “opting out”);
and enabling or permissive (inapplicable unless there has been “opting
in” by specific election).114 When LLSV coded the original ADRI, they
failed to distinguish explicitly between these categories. 115 In contrast,
when DLLS recoded the ADRI in 2008, they ignored enabling rules,
meaning that a country would only receive a positive score when its
corporate law had a default or mandatory rule providing the relevant
protection to shareholders.116 The creators of the CBR SPI similarly
awarded points only for mandatory and default rules.117 DLLS did not
indicate specifically which rules they focused on with the ASDI, but
because they were seeking to measure “hurdles” that had to be jumped,118
they should not have taken into account permissive enabling rules.
111. MATHIAS SIEMS ET AL., CBR EXTENDED SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION INDEX 4 (2009),
http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/centre-for-business-research/downloads/resear
ch-projects-output/Shareholder%20protection%20index%20references%2025%20countries.pdf.
112. Siems, supra note 29, at 117.
113. SIEMS ET AL., supra note 111, at 34.
114. BRIAN R. CHEFFINS, COMPANY LAW: THEORY, STRUCTURE AND OPERATION 217–20
(1997).
115. See DLLS, supra note 36, at 454.
116. Id.
117. SIEMS ET AL., supra note 111, at 3–4 (indicating that only mandatory laws were counted
with respect to rules precluding shares with multiple voting rights and requiring a shareholder to
make a takeover bid for all shares upon acquiring a specified percentage of shares). Professors
Dionysia Katelouzou and Mathias Siems, working with CBR SPI data, subsequently categorized
legal rules that were elements of the CBR SPI as “enabling” and “paternalistic.” Katelouzou &
Siems, supra note 101, at 132. In so doing, they were not attempting to revamp the basic typology
of corporate law rules set out here but rather were distinguishing between those CBR SPI rules
that automatically imposed the rights in question on shareholders—“paternalistic”—and those
where shareholders had to be proactive to exercise the rights they had been given—“enabling.”
See id.
118. DLLS, supra note 36, at 432.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol68/iss3/1

22

Cheffins et al.: Shareholder Protection Across Time

2016]

SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION ACROSS TIME

713

Changing the types of rules that count can significantly alter scores
awarded. In 1998, LLSV gave the United States an overall score of “5”
for the ADRI, with the only “0” occurring because shareholders lacked
preemptive rights under Delaware law, which LLSV focused on to code
the United States.119 In Delaware, a corporation is authorized to “opt in”
to give shareholders cumulative voting rights and the right to call an
extraordinary meeting.120 LLSV gave the United States a “1” for both
variables, but when DLLS recoded the ADRI in 2008, they coded both as
“0” because the rules governing these areas of the law were enabling
rather than presumptive or mandatory.121 This meant the aggregate score
for the United States dropped from a “5” for LLSV to a “3” for DLLS.122
Since DLLS themselves treated the revised ADRI as superior to the
original, we decided to adopt the same approach to enabling rules and
excluded laws of this type from consideration when coding the ADRI
going back through time.
Given how DLLS scored the ADRI for the United States, it might
seem that “3” would be the obvious present-day baseline for historical
research on Delaware. Spamann’s recoding of the ADRI, however,
provides an additional wrinkle. Like DLLS, he discounted enabling rules
and so awarded the United States “0”s for cumulative voting and for the
calling of shareholder meetings.123 Spamann, however, awarded the
United States a “2” rather than a “3” overall because he adopted a tougher
standard than DLLS for awarding a “1” for proxy voting, a standard that
Delaware failed to meet.124 Spamann’s coding of Delaware law provides
as credible a departure point for our analysis as does DLLS’s coding, so
we correspondingly decided to rely on both.
F. Who Made the Rules?
As part of our exercise of determining present-day coding before
working backwards, we needed to determine not only the form of the
relevant rules but also their source. The ADRI was scored purely by
reference to “company and bankruptcy/reorganization laws” and
excluded securities law and stock exchange listing rules. 125 LLSV were
119. LLSV, supra note 35, at 1119, 1130.
120. Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at 1746–47.
121. Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 33, at 607.
122. Id. at 606.
123. Spamann’s article does not provide an element-by-element breakdown of ADRI scores
for the United States or any other country. For this data, see Holger Spamann, The “Antidirector
Rights
Index”
Revisited:
Supplementary
Data,
REV. FIN. STUD.
(2010),
http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/content/suppl/2009/09/24/hhp067.DC1/ADRI_RFS.xls.
124. See Spamann, supra note 40, at 474 & n.22.
125. LLSV, supra note 35, at 1120.
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prepared, however, to factor in judicial rulings when scoring
jurisdictions.126 For instance, they explicitly drew attention to the U.S.
derivative suit as an example of a legal mechanism that afforded
shareholders protection against perceived oppression, and its contours are
defined primarily by case law.127
At first glance, it seems there is no need to go any further than LLSV
did in identifying the laws that offer shareholder protection in the United
States. Corporate law constitutes the most obvious source of shareholder
rights, and the relevant statutes are promulgated at state level.128 While
proposals to provide for federal incorporation predate the adoption of the
U.S. Constitution,129 Congress has consistently resisted calls to provide
for federal incorporation, leaving the matter instead to the states.130 Each
state has in turn promulgated a general corporate statute establishing the
procedure for incorporating businesses and providing the ground rules
governing the internal affairs of already incorporated companies.131
When a corporation is incorporated under the laws of a particular state,
that state’s corporate law will be applicable notwithstanding where the
principal place of business might be. The laws of the state of
incorporation will be determinative due to a choice of law rule known as
“the internal affairs doctrine” which does much to sustain Delaware’s
status as the leading supplier of corporate charters.132
The internal affairs doctrine has also formed the basis of an
understanding among federal and state lawmakers that has done much to
shape U.S. corporate law. The key precept is that the internal affairs of
corporations fall within the purview of state law and are not a proper
subject for federal regulation.133 Some judicial rulings imply that due to
the nature of the U.S. federal system, the internal affairs doctrine is
126. Id. at 1126.
127. Id. at 1128; see also Armour, Black & Cheffins, supra note 8, at 1349 (describing the
prerequisites for bringing a derivative suit in Delaware as a “judicial construct”).
128. Jill E. Fisch, Leave It to Delaware: Why Congress Should Stay out of Corporate
Governance, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 731, 732 (2013); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping
Federalization of Corporate Law, REG., Spring 2003, at 26, 26 (“For over 200 years, corporate
governance has been a matter for state law.”).
129. William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Equilibrium Content of Federalism,
41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 619, 652–53 (2006).
130. Robert B. Thompson, Delaware, the Feds, and the Stock Exchange: Challenges to the
First State as First in Corporate Law, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 779, 784 (2004) [hereinafter Thompson,
Delaware, the Feds, and the Stock Exchange]; Robert B. Thompson, Delaware’s Disclosure:
Moving the Line of Federal-State Corporate Regulation, U. ILL. L. REV. 167, 177 (2009).
131. Wells, supra note 66, at 573.
132. Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J.
CORP. L. 33, 39, 42–43 (2006).
133. Renee M. Jones, Does Federalism Matter? Its Perplexing Role in the Corporate
Governance Debate, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 879, 882 (2006).
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constitutionally mandated.134 This in fact is not the case. The correct view
is that federal corporate law-making authority is very broad and that
Congress could if it wished federalize corporate law largely without
limit.135
Constitutional potentialities aside, over most of U.S. history, Congress
steered clear of enacting federal corporate law. There was no meaningful
federal contribution to U.S. corporate law until the enactment of the
Securities Act of 1933136 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,137
which established the federal Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC).138 Even these important pieces of legislation ultimately
constituted only a tentative foray by Congress into the corporate law
realm. Although the SEC would subsequently argue that key aspects of
the 1934 Act authorized it to create rules that directly affected the
governance of corporations, such as regulation of shareholder voting
conducted by proxy,139 this was not the consensus view at the time the
federal securities law reform was undertaken.140 The standard assumption
was that federal regulation should target trading markets with disclosure
and anti-fraud rules—“securities law”—thereby leaving “corporate law”
relating to the internal affairs of companies to the states.141 The legislative
history relating to the enactment of the 1933 and 1934 Acts indeed
indicates that Congress did not intend to authorize federal securities
regulators to interfere in the management of companies.142
This pattern began to change in the late 20th century. Between the
1968 enactment of the Williams Act,143 which amended section 14 of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to impose a range of obligations on
parties making a tender offer to acquire shares,144 and the close of the
20th century, there were various federal incursions into the corporate law
134. COX & HAZEN, supra note 7, § 2:13, at 172; Greenwood, supra note 9, at 413; Roe,
Delaware’s Competition, supra note 18, at 596.
135. Fisch, supra note 128, at 737–38; Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 18, at 597.
136. Pub. L. No. 73–22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012)).
137. Pub. L. No. 73–291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp).
138. Id. § 4(a).
139. Patrick Moyer, The Regulation of Corporate Law by Securities Regulators: A
Comparison of Ontario and the United States, 55 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REV. 43, 49 (1997).
140. See id.
141. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 129, at 624–25. During the 1930s, a variety of tax
provisions were enacted that appeared to be motivated at least in part by the desire to affect
corporate governance, but these were usually defended on tax policy grounds as well. See Steven
A. Bank, Tax, Corporate Governance, and Norms, 61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1159, 1163–64
(2004).
142. Moyer, supra note 139, at 49–50.
143. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.
(2012)).
144. See id. at 454–57.
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realm. Laws and regulations were adopted fostering disclosure of
transactions involving publicly traded companies going private,
discouraging the listing of dual-class shares and deregulating proxy
requirements to facilitate institutional shareholder voice.145 Federal tax
provisions also limited the tax deductibility of executive
compensation.146
These post-1968 incursions would soon be overshadowed, however,
by the most ambitious federal corporate law initiative to date. The gamechanger was the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX),147 which Congress
enacted in response to high-profile corporate scandals involving
companies such as WorldCom and Enron.148 As Mark Roe observed in a
2003 article where he emphasized the federal government’s impact on
competitive federalism, “with [SOX] in 2002, Congress did not even
pretend to stay on the disclosure-and-trading side of the rhetorically
traditional federal-state division of power, not even offering perfunctory
respect for state rules governing the corporation’s internal affairs.”149
The nature and depth of SOX’s corporate law content was something
of a shock to those who had assumed the states’ preeminence.150 SOX
made key changes that included creating the possibility of executive pay
“clawbacks” where there had been problematic restatements of corporate
earnings, prohibiting corporate loans to senior executives, requiring CEO
certification of financial reports filed with the SEC, granting the SEC
formal authority to regulate the structure and duties of board committees
dealing with the audit function, and giving the SEC explicit powers to
formulate accounting standards.151
The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010 (Dodd–Frank Act)152 constituted another substantial federal
incursion into the corporate law realm. While this post-financial crisis
legislation focused primarily on the regulation of banks, it contained a
145. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 18, at 616, 620–21.
146. Bank, supra note 141, at 1161.
147. Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 18, 28,
and 29 U.S.C. (2012)).
148. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 129, at 664–65.
149. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 18, at 633.
150. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 129, at 667–68 (noting that the “off-handed but
emphatic revision of the internal affairs line drawn after 1934 . . . upset settled expectations”).
151. Brown, supra note 11, at 358–71; see also Robert B. Ahdieh, From “Federalization”
to “Mixed Governance” in Corporate Law: A Defense of Sarbanes–Oxley, 53 BUFFALO L. REV.
721, 724–25 (2005) (discussing the SOX auditing requirements in depth). See generally Brian R.
Cheffins, Introduction, in 1 THE HISTORY OF MODERN U.S. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE xxvi (Brian
R. Cheffins ed., 2011) (providing background on why SOX was enacted and the controversial
response its enactment received).
152. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12,
and 15 U.S.C.).
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subtitle entitled “Strengthening Corporate Governance” applicable to all
issuers falling under the SEC’s jurisdiction, not just financial
companies.153 This subtitle amended federal securities law to instruct the
SEC to introduce rules requiring companies that had not split the chief
executive officer and chairman of the board roles to explain why and to
authorize the SEC to develop a “proxy access” rule permitting
shareholders with significant stakes to nominate directors on a company’s
own proxy card under prescribed circumstances.154 Another subtitle of
Dodd–Frank, dealing with executive compensation,155 amended federal
securities laws to mandate an advisory “say on pay” shareholder vote and
additional compensation disclosures for all publicly traded companies
subject to SEC jurisdiction.156
The ADRI, due to its exclusive focus on state corporate law, 157 does
not take account of securities law-based federal initiatives that might
bolster shareholder protection. The situation is different with the ASDI
and the CBR SPI, which both factor in a wider range of laws and
correspondingly can reflect rules promulgated outside the state context.
With the ADSI, DLLS coded by reference to “stock market act(s) and
regulations” (i.e. securities law) and stock exchange listing rules, as well
as corporate legislation and judicial precedent.158 With the CBR SPI,
Siems and his colleagues similarly took into account federal securities
law and stock exchange listing rules in addition to state corporate law
statutes and case law.159
To simplify rule categorization, this Article treats all laws not
promulgated at state level as “federal,” in the sense that they apply
nationwide. Who are the relevant federal rule makers? Congress
obviously is one. Though there is no federal incorporation legislation,
since the early 1930s Congress has periodically enacted statutory
measures as part of federal securities law that operate as de facto
corporate law.160 The SEC is another rule maker. As the administrative
agency charged with administering federal securities law, the SEC
promulgates regulations and issues rulings pursuant to the statutory

153. See id. §§ 971–72.
154. Id.
155. Id. §§ 951–57.
156. See id. § 951 (explaining shareholder voting on executive compensation); § 953
(discussing disclosure). Of the provisions in Title IX, Subtitle E governs all publicly traded
companies subject to SEC jurisdiction save for § 956, which requires disclosure of executive pay
arrangements to regulators only if it is one of several “covered financial institutions.” Id. § 956.
157. LLSV, supra note 35, at 1120.
158. See DLLS, supra note 36, at 433.
159. See Siems, supra note 29, at 120 (explaining the coding process used in the research).
160. See supra notes 143–48 and accompanying text.
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mandate under which it operates.161 Federal courts are a third rule maker,
as they interpret federal securities law and SEC regulations and rulings.162
Beyond the official governmental realm, there are private actors—
leading national stock exchanges—whose rules are taken into account in
ADRI and CBR SPI coding and which this Article treats as generating
“federal” rules. The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), for instance, is
a private body, not an agency of the federal government. Nevertheless,
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires the NYSE, operating as a
national securities exchange and self-regulatory organization under the
Act, to submit listing rules governing companies traded on the NYSE to
the SEC for approval.163 Also, the SEC can amend the NYSE’s listing
rules to further the purposes of the 1934 Act.164 The SEC thus has
substantial power to ask, and even direct, the NYSE to make rules that
affect shareholder protections.165 Indeed, Professor Robert Thompson, in
discussing NYSE listing rule amendments promulgated from the late
1970s onwards dealing with governance-related topics such as
shareholder voting rights, board composition, and shareholder approval
of executive pay, has said, “Without the SEC’s leadership, the exchanges
would not likely have entered into the arena of corporate governance.”166
II. HYPOTHESES AND FINDINGS
The historically-oriented leximetric investigation of U.S. corporate
law that forms the core of this Article allows us to analyze numerous
aspects of shareholder protection under corporate and securities law. To
ensure our empirical research directly addresses the key issues, we have
generated a series of specific, testable hypotheses set out in Section II.A.
Section II.B sets out present day scores for Delaware, the Model Act and
Illinois under the ADRI, the ASDI, and the CBR SPI. Section II.C
examines historical trends.
A. Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Shareholder protection index scores, to the extent
they reflect state law, should decline over time. The first hypothesis, and
perhaps the most obvious, that can be tested by using the ADRI, ASDI,
and CBR SPI to measure shareholder protection over time is that scores
should decline over time, at least when measuring state corporate law.
161.
162.
163.
(2012)).
164.
165.
166.

Roe, supra note 19, at 11.
Id.
Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 19(b), 48 Stat. 881, 898 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78s
See id. § 19(c).
Roe, supra note 19, at 11.
Thompson, Delaware, the Feds, and the Stock Exchange, supra note 130, at 795–97.
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The corporate law “race” rhetoric used to characterize the evolution of
the law, whether to the top or bottom, connotes movement.167 Moreover,
given the general consensus that competition among states for
incorporation business in the twentieth century served to erode
shareholder rights while enhancing managerial flexibility,168 shareholder
protection scores dictated by state law should have fallen.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Shareholder protection index scores, to the extent
they reflect federal law, should increase over time. While the standard
narrative is that shareholder rights have eroded over time, various
observers have cited reform at the federal level to argue that shareholder
protection was in fact bolstered from the 1930s onwards.169 Assuming
these observers are correct, one would expect that federally influenced
shareholder protection scores should have risen.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): If changes to federal law heavily influenced the
scoring of individual components of shareholder protection indices, these
indices’ aggregate scores should have increased over time. Due to
growing recognition of the role the federal government has played, the
conventional wisdom concerning state dominance of the U.S. system of
corporate law federalism has been shifting over the past decade. 170 The
extent of federal influence, however, is open to debate.171 If this influence
was substantial, then federal intervention fortifying shareholder rights
may have been enough to more than offset any erosion of those rights at
the state level, meaning the overall level of shareholder protection would
have increased.
All three of these hypotheses can be tested with the ASDI and the
CBR SPI. This is because these indices are scored not only by reference
to state corporate law, but also by reference to securities law and rules
developed by key players at the federal level, namely the SEC and
national stock exchanges.172 With the ADRI, the fact that coding occurs
purely by reference to state corporate law means that scoring over time
can only be used to test H1.
B. Present-Day Scores
Given our methodology, which involves determining present-day
coding before working backwards,173 the scoring begins with considering
each jurisdiction’s present-day score under the selected indices. This not
only constitutes the foundation for our historical analysis, but also
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 18, at 609.
See supra notes 4–6 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Romano, supra note 20, at 213, 223.
See supra Section I.F.
See supra Section I.C.
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provides insights into the level of shareholder protection the United States
currently offers compared to other countries. Under the ADRI, which is
governed solely by state corporate law, the U.S. scores poorly by global
standards. In contrast, with the ASDI and the CBR SPI, both of which
factor in federal securities regulation and stock market listing rules, the
level of shareholder protection is high in global terms.
1. ADRI
With the ADRI, as mentioned we draw upon the approaches DLLS
and Spamann developed.174 As shown in Table 4, DLLS gave the United
States (i.e., Delaware) a “3” out of “6” overall, while Spamann gave
Delaware an aggregate score of “2.” This discrepancy arises from the
proxy voting element of the ADRI. DLLS gave Delaware a “1” for proxy
voting175 because the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL)
explicitly authorizes voting by proxy.176 Spamann only gave countries a
“1” with this variable if the law required that proxies provide for yes or
no “two-way” voting.177 Delaware corporate law does not do this, so he
scored this element “0.”
Table 4: Delaware’s Present-Day ADRI Scores
ADRI Element

DLLS

Spamann

Vote by Proxy
Allowed

1

0

No Block

1

1

Justification for Present-Day
Score
DGCL § 212(b) gives shareholders
the right to vote by proxy but does
not provide, as Spamann requires,
for two way voting.178
“Under the default regime, firms
cannot require deposit of
shares . . . by stockholders
exercising their right to vote.”179

174. See supra Sections I.C–I.E.
175. DLLS, Data, supra note 81 (Revised Antidir tab, col. B).
176. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(b) (2015); see also DLLS, supra note 36, at 454 (indicating
that it would suffice if “shareholders can vote by mail on each of the items on the agenda through
a ballot or proxy form”). For the elements of DLLS’s revised ADRI, see id. at 455 tbl.9.
177. Holger Spamann, On the Insignificance and/or Endogeneity of La Porta et al.’s ‘AntiDirector Rights Index’ Under Consistent Coding 27 (Harvard Law Sch., John M. Olin Ctr. for
Law, Econ., & Bus. Fellows’ Discussion Paper No. 7, 2006), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.c
fm?abstract_id=894301. “Yes or no” or “two-way” voting refers to a proxy form that explicitly
gives shareholders the ability to instruct the proxy to vote for or against a resolution. Id. at 24.
178. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(b) (2015).
179. Holger Spamann, Appendix to the ‘Anti-Director Rights Index’ Revisited, REV. FIN.
STUD. 183 (2010), http://rfs.oxfordjournals.org/content/suppl/2009/09/24/hhp067.DC1/hhp067_
suppl_data.pdf.
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Cumulative
Voting
Oppressed
Minority

0

0

1

1

Preemptive
Rights

0

0

Ability to Call
General Meeting

0

0

Total

3184

2185

721

DGCL § 214 provides for an
enabling rule, not a default rule.180
Minority shareholders can enforce
breaches of duty by directors with a
derivative suit and can challenge
shareholder amendments to the
corporate charter on grounds of
“unfairness.”181
“Preemptive rights exist only to the
extent expressly granted in the
[certificate of incorporation].”182
“[S]hareholders can call a special
meeting only if allowed by, and
under the conditions specified in,
the [certificate of
incorporation].”183

Given that in recent years Delaware law has not been amended in a
way that would affect the scoring of any ADRI variables, DLLS’s and
Spamann’s codings for U.S. corporate law should determine Delaware’s
present-day score for this Article’s purposes. These codings imply that
Delaware corporate law is not “shareholder friendly,” at least in
comparison with other countries scored using the ADRI. DLLS’s U.S.
score of “3” was substantially below the average score of 4.29 DLLS
awarded to common law countries and was similar to the average for civil
law countries (2.88).186 According to Spamann’s coding, Delaware’s
aggregate ADRI score of “2” trailed well behind the overall average for
common law countries (4.06) and civil law countries (3.93).187 Indeed,
no country had a lower overall score.188
180. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214.
181. Spamann, supra note 179, at 184.
182. Id. (citation omitted) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(3)).
183. Id. (citation omitted) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(d)).
184. DLLS, Data, supra note 81 (Revised Antidir tab); Spamann, supra note 40, at 475
tbl.1.
185. Spamann, supra note 40, at 475 tbl.1. For an in-depth look at this data, see Spamann,
supra note 123.
186. See DLLS, supra note 36, at 460 & tbl.13 (discussing the common law averages). DLLS
did not specify the civil law average but was set out in Table XII of a working paper version.
DLLS, The Law and Economics of Self-Dealing 62 tbl.12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research
Working Paper Series, Paper No. 11883, 2005), http://www.nber.org/papers/w11883.pdf. In his
2010 article, Spamann provided different averages for the DLLS ADRI, namely 4.22 for common
law countries and 3.11 for civil law countries. Spamann, supra note 40, at 475 tbl.1. DLLS and
Spamann provided aggregate data for civil law and common law countries because an important
feature of the “law and finance” literature has been to determine whether legal protection relevant
to investors differs among different legal families, such as civil or common law.
187. Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 33, at 606, 608 tbl.2.
188. Spamann, supra note 40, at 475 tbl.1.
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For both Illinois and the Model Act, using DLLS’s approach to the
ADRI, “4” appears to be the appropriate present-day aggregate score (see
tables 5 and 6). This aligns these jurisdictions more closely with the
DLLS average for common law countries and means that they have
significantly higher aggregate scores than the typical civil law country.
The situation is somewhat different if Spamann’s methodology is used.
Given that neither the Model Act nor Illinois mandate the use of two-way
proxies, under Spamann’s methodology their aggregate present-day
scores become “3” rather than “4” respectively. This is below the overall
average for both common law countries and civil law countries, but the
discrepancy is not as dramatic as with Delaware.
Table 5: Illinois Present-Day ADRI Scores
ADRI Element

DLLS

Spamann

Justification for PresentDay Score

Vote by Proxy
Allowed

1

0

No Block

1

1

Cumulative Voting

1

1

Oppressed
Minority

1

1

Preemptive Rights

0

0

Ability to Call
General Meeting

0

0

Illinois Business Corporation
Act (IBCA) § 7.50; reasoning
for scoring is the same as
Delaware.189
IBCA § 7.25 (provides for the
concept of record ownership
of shares, which means
companies can identify who is
entitled to vote without
blocking share transfers prior
to shareholder meetings).190
IBCA § 7.40 requires
cumulative voting unless the
articles of incorporation say
otherwise.191
Brown v. Tenney, 532 N.E.2d
230, 232–33 (Ill. 1988);
Kalabogias v. Georgou, 254
Ill. App. 3d 740, 747 (1993);
IBCA §7.80 (governing the
procedure for derivative
litigation).
IBCA § 6.50, which merely
permits preemptive rights to
be created in the certificate of
incorporation.192
IBCA § 7.05 (shareholders
owning 20% of the shares can
call a meeting, which exceeds

189. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.50 (2015) (stating that “[a] shareholder may appoint a
proxy to vote”).
190. Id. 5/7.25.
191. Id. 5/7.40.
192. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6.50.
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10% maximum required for a
“1”).”193

Total

4

3

Table 6: Model Act Present-Day ADRI Scores
ADRI Element

DLLS

Spamann

Justification for PresentDay Score

Vote by Proxy
Allowed

1

0

No Block

1

1

Cumulative Voting

0

0

Oppressed Minority

1

1

Preemptive Rights

0

0

Ability to Call
General Meeting

1

1

Model Act § 7.22; reasoning
for scoring is the same as
Delaware.194
Spamann cites Model Act §§
6.27 and 7.07 to show blocking
is permissible.195
Model
Act
§ 7.28(b)
(providing for an enabling rule,
not a default rule).196
Spamann (2008, p. 184), citing
Model Act §§ 8.31, 8.61,
13.02,
and
Chapter
7
Subchapter D.197
Model Act § 6.30; reasoning
similar to that for Illinois; see
also Spamann (2008, p.
184).198
Model Act § 7.02(a) (10%
threshold).199

Total

4

3

2. ASDI
Recall that the second index upon which we rely, the ASDI, measures
the law applicable to a hypothetical self-dealing transaction by way of a
public and private enforcement index.200 The ASDI private enforcement
index is comprised of two sub-indices relating respectively to ex ante and
ex post control.201 For the most part, each of these sub-indices’ presentday scores for Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Act are identical. With
193. Id. 5/7.05.
194. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.22 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
195. See Spamann, supra note 180, at 184 (citing MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. §§ 6.27,
7.07).
196. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.28(b); Spamann, supra note 180, at 184 (“Preemptive
rights exist only to the extent expressly granted in the [certificate of incorporation].” (citations
omitted)).
197. See Spamann, supra note 180, at 184 (citing MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. §§ 8.31, 8.61,
13.02).
198. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 6.30.
199. Id. § 7.02(a).
200. See supra text accompanying note 89.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 93–95.
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the Model Act, this is partly due to our drawing upon Delaware and
Illinois scoring for one ASDI element where coding was problematic, as
the Model Act is a model statute not anchored to the laws of a particular
state.202
The element we drew on from Delaware and Illinois law to code the
ASDI for the Model Act involves a component of the ex post control of
the anti-self-dealing index regarding “access to evidence.”203 With
“access to evidence,” the possible overall score ranges from “0” to “1.”204
A jurisdiction receives 0.25 each when a plaintiff-shareholder
challenging the hypothetical transaction who owns at least ten percent of
the shares can (i) request that a court investigate the self-dealing
transaction; (ii) request “documents relevant to the case from the
defendant”; (iii) ask the defendant questions prior to trial without prior
judicial approval; and (iv) ask the same of non-parties without judicial
approval.205 For U.S. companies, these issues are governed by civil
procedure rules of the state where the litigation would occur rather than
by corporate law itself.206 Given that DLLS awarded the United States
(i.e., Delaware) a “0.75” for access to evidence207 and given that this in
all likelihood is the appropriate score for Illinois,208 we have given the
same score to the Model Act.
Although ASDI scores are much the same for Delaware, the Model
Act, and Illinois, the situation is different for disclosure requirements in
the ex ante private control of self-dealing index applicable to Buyer Co.
and Mr. James. DLLS awarded the United States (i.e., Delaware) “1” for
these variables.209 They did not do so because an explicit statutory duty
is imposed; there are no provisions mandating such disclosure in the
DGCL.210 Instead, it appears that Delaware received “1”s for disclosure
202. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN., intro. xix (stating that “[t]he Model Act is designed as a
free-standing general corporation statute”).
203. See DLLS, supra note 36, at 434 tbl.1.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See infra note 304 and accompanying text.
207. See DLLS, Data, supra note 81 (Ex Post Control tab, col. H).
208. On Delaware, DLLS, Data, supra note 81, Ex Ante Control tab, columns D and E.
Illinois should be given one-quarter point each because, under the hypothetical, the plaintiff
shareholder could request documents, could ask the defendant questions prior to trial and could
do the same with non-parties. See ILCS Supreme Court Rules, R. 206 (right to conduct oral
depositions of parties and non-parties), R. 210 (right to conduct written depositions of parties and
non-parties), R. 213 (right to conduct interrogatories), R. 214 (right to demand document
production). The overall score should not be 1.00 because Illinois, like Delaware, lacks procedural
or corporate law rules permitting a shareholder to request a court investigation.
209. DLLS, Data, supra note 81 (Ex Ante Control tab, cols. D–E).
210. See Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at 1758–59 & n.127 (citing DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2014)).
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by Buyer Co. and by Mr. James because the relevant disclosures would
have to occur for the parties to the hypothetical transaction to be able to
rely on a statutory “safe harbor” provision in Delaware’s corporate statute
designed to help shield a related-party transaction from challenge and
protect the directors involved from liability.211
The Model Act’s related-party transaction “safe harbor” provision is
worded similarly to Delaware’s,212 meaning the Model Act similarly
should receive “1”s for the rules governing disclosure by the Buyer Co.
and Mr. James. In contrast, Illinois’s “safe harbor” provision explicitly
ensures that a transaction can be insulated from challenge if it was “fair”
regardless of whether ex ante disclosure occurred. The relevant measure
provides that the absence of full disclosure merely shifts the burden of
proof on to those asserting that the related-party transaction should be
treated as valid on the grounds of its fairness.213 Correspondingly, Illinois
should receive a “0” both for rules governing disclosure by the Buyer Co.
and by Mr. James. With Illinois scoring “0”s for other elements of the
ASDI’s ex ante private control of self-dealing sub-index, Table 7 shows
that Delaware and the Model Act necessarily have higher overall scores.
Table 7: Present-Day ASDI Ex Ante Private Control of Self-Dealing
Sub-index—Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Act
ASDI
Element

Delaware

Illinois

Model Act

Disinterested
Shareholder
Approval

0

0

0

Justification
for PresentDay Score
None of the
jurisdictions
have rules in
place requiring
that
shareholders
vote on relatedparty
transactions.
The United
Kingdom is an
example of a
jurisdiction
where such
approval is
required.214

211. Id. at 1758–59.
212. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.61 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
213. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.60 (2015); see also Janice M. Church, Director Conflict of
Interest Under the 1983 B.C.A.; A Standard of Fairness, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 741, 750 (“Section
8.60 supports such an approach because it relegates factors relevant to procedural fairness—
disclosure and approval—to the issue of shifting the burden of proof.”).
214. Companies Act 2006, c. 46, §§ 190–96 (UK).
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Disclosure by
Buyer Co.

1

0

1

Disclosure by
Mr. James

1

0

1

Independent
Review

0

0

0

Ex Ante
Disclosure

0.67

0

0.67

Ex Ante
Private
Control of
Self-Dealing

0.33

0

0.33

See discussion
on disclosure
above.215
See discussion
of disclosure
above.216
None of the
jurisdictions
require that an
independent
auditor or
financial expert
scrutinize a
related-party
transaction.217
Average of
previous three
variables.218
Average of
approval by
disinterested
shareholders
and ex ante
disclosure.219

Compared with countries elsewhere the ex ante private control of selfdealing scores for the regimes we focus on are mediocre at best. The
Delaware and Model Act scores of 0.33 were below the average of 0.36
for the seventy-two countries DLLS focused on.220 Only three of the
countries—Austria, Hungary, and Tunisia—scored as poorly as Illinois
with its 0.00.221
With ex post private control of self-dealing, the story is much
different. The overall Delaware, Illinois, and Model Act scores of 0.98
(see Table 8) are inferior to only one jurisdiction—Singapore with
1.00.222 Unlike with ex ante private control of self-dealing, the ex post
sub-index elements did not vary between Delaware, Illinois, and the
Model Act.

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

See supra notes 209–13 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 209–13 and accompanying text.
See Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at 1756 tbl.2.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 1756.
DLLS, Data, supra note 81 (Ex Ante Control tab, col. H).
Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at 1756.
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Table 8: Present-Day ASDI Ex Post Private Control of SelfDealing Sub-index and Overall ASDI Scores—Delaware, Illinois,
and the Model Act
ASDI Element

Delaware

Illinois

Model Act

Justification
for PresentDay Score

Disclosure
in
periodic
filings
Standing to Sue
(equals 1 if a
derivative suit can
be brought against
Mr. James and
bodies approving
the transaction)

1

1

1

Federal
regulations.223

1

1

1

Rescission (equals
1 if rescission is
available if the
transaction is
unfair or involves
a conflict of
interest)

1

1

1

Ease of Holding
Mr. James Liable
(equals 1 if the
interested director
is liable if the

1

1

1

Discussion of
derivative
action in
relation to the
oppressed
minority
variable
above.224
At common
law, a relatedparty
transaction was
void or at least
voidable.225
Delaware,
Illinois, and the
Model Act each
have statutory
safe harbor
provisions that
can shelter
transactions
from
challenge.226
However, these
provisions
would not
operate if a
transaction was
unfair or had
not been
approved by the
board or the
shareholders.
The Model Act
specifically
recognizes that
damages will
be recoverable

223.
224.
225.
226.

See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.494, 240.14a-2, 240.15d-1 (2016).
See supra Tables 4–6.
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8, subch. F, intro. cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
See supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text.
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transaction is
unfair, oppressive,
or prejudicial)

Ease of Holding
Approving Body
Liable (equals 1 if
the members of
the approving
body are liable if
the transaction is
unfair, oppressive,
or prejudicial)

1

1

1

Access to
Evidence

0.75

0.75

0.75

when a relatedparty
transaction
cannot be saved
under a
statutory safe
harbor.227 The
remedy should
also be
available at
common law.228
Unclear.
Relevant
Delaware case
law indicates
that, in a
related-party
transaction
context,
directors who
approve a onesided
transaction will
be held liable
only if they
have breached
duties of
loyalty and care
(i.e., gross
negligence).229
Under DLLS’s
coding scheme,
this means the
United States
should have
received “0.”
However,
consistent with
our policy of
deferring to
original
coding,230 all
three
jurisdictions are
scored “1.”
See discussion
on access to

227. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.61(a).
228. See, e.g., Levin v. Levin, 405 A.2d 770, 779 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1979).
229. See, e.g., In re Loral Space & Comm’ns, Inc., 2008 WL 4293781, at *33 (Del. Ch. 2008)
(“[B]eing a non-independent director who approved a conflict transaction found unfair does not
make one, without more, liable personally for harm caused. Rather, the court must examine that
director’s behavior in order to assess whether the director breached her fiduciary duties . . . .”).
230. See supra Section I.C.
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Ease of Proving
Wrongdoing

0.95

0.95

0.95

Ex Post Private
Control of SelfDealing

0.98

0.98

0.98

Anti-self-dealing
Index (Private
Enforcement)

0.65

0.49

0.65

729

evidence
above.231
Average of
previous five
variables.232
Average of
disclosure and
ease of private
wrongdoing.233
Average of ex
ante private
control of selfdealing and ex
post private
control of selfdealing.234

As Table 8 indicates, with the ASDI the ex ante and ex post subindices are averaged to produce an overall ASDI private enforcement
score. For Delaware and the Model Act, the combination of the very high
ex post private control of self-dealing score with the mediocre score of
0.33 for ex ante private control yields an overall present-day score of
0.65. This placed Delaware (i.e., the United States) tenth highest among
the seventy-two countries DLLS coded and well above the global average
of 0.44.235 Illinois’s overall private control of self-dealing score of 0.49—
despite being driven downwards by the score of 0 with ex ante private
control—would have still placed Illinois twenty-fourth out of the
seventy-two countries.236
3. CBR SPI
With the CBR SPI, the third and final index we consider, when Siems
and his CBR co-authors scored the United States (again, meaning
Delaware) for 2005, they gave it a score of 7.25 out of 10. 237 When they
updated the CBR SPI in 2013, the score for the United States increased
to 7.5, because the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 introduced an advisory sayon-pay vote for executive pay.238 There have been no relevant changes to
the law since. Given our methodological choice not to depart from scores

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
2013).

See supra notes 203–08 and accompanying text.
Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at 1757 tbl.3.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 1756, 1757 tbl.3.
See DLLS, Data, supra note 81 (Ex Post Control tab, col. K).
See Armour et al., supra note 49, at 357 tbl.2, 359.
MATHIAS SIEMS ET AL., CBR EXTENDED SHAREHOLDER PROTECTION INDEX 106 (2d ed.
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generated by those initially constructing an index we use, Delaware’s
present-day score correspondingly is 7.5, as shown in Table 9 below.
Table 9: Delaware Present-Day CBR SPI Scores
CBR SPI Element

Delaware
Score (2013–
present day)

Justification for Present-Day
Score239

Powers of the General Meeting
for de facto changes (the level
of shareholder approval
required for a sale of the
company’s assets governs the
score)

0.75

Agenda Setting Power (the
score is based on the ability of
shareholders owning specified
percentages of shares to put a
matter to a shareholder vote)

1

Anticipation of Shareholder
Decision Facilitated (equals 0.5
if postal voting is possible; 1 if
postal voting is possible and
companies soliciting proxies
must use “two-way”—“yes”
and “no”—proxy forms)
Prohibition of Multiple Voting
Rights

1

DGCL § 271 requires shareholder
approval for the sale, lease, or
exchange of “substantially all” of the
assets.240 The relevant case law
indicates that fifty percent does not
automatically constitute
“substantially all,” which was the
threshold specified for awarding a
“1.”241
SEC Rule 14a-7 (requiring a public
company to provide a shareholder list
to shareholders who ask).242 SEC
Rule 14a-8 allows shareholders
meeting modest share ownership
requirements to circulate resolutions
in proxy material their company
circulates.243
NYSE Manual, § 402.04 (requiring
listed companies to solicit proxies to
facilitate shareholder voting);244
SEC Rule 14a-4(b)(1) (mandating
use of two way proxies).245

Independent Board Members
(equals 1 if at least half of the
board members must be

1

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

0.5

NYSE Manual § 313.00 states that
voting rights cannot be disparately
reduced or restricted but that
companies with non-voting shares
are permitted to continue to list and
issue such shares.246
NYSE Manual § 303A.01 states that
half of the board members must be
independent.247

Id. at 105–07; SIEMS ET AL., supra note 111, at 103–05.
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 271(a) (2015).
SIEMS ET AL., supra note 111, at 103.
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a–7 (2016).
Id. § 240.14a–8.
N.Y. STOCK EXCH. LISTED CO. MANUAL § 402.04 (2013) [hereinafter NYSE MANUAL].
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4.
NYSE MANUAL, supra note 244, § 313.00.
Id. § 303A.01.
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independent; 0.5 if twenty-five
percent of them must be
independent)
Feasibility of Director’s
Dismissal (equals 0.75 if a
dismissed director can only
claim for contractual
compensation if dismissed
without good reason if
compensation is specifically
contractually agreed)
Private Enforcement of Director
Duties (score is based on the
ease with which a minority
shareholder can bring a
derivative suit)

Shareholder Action Against
Resolutions of the General
Meeting (equals 1 if every
shareholder is eligible to
challenge a shareholder
resolution)

731

0.75

There can be compensation
agreements with dismissed directors
(DGCL § 141(k)),248 and
shareholders, by virtue of the DoddFrank Act of 2010,249 have the right
to an advisory “say-on-pay” vote.250

0.75

Siems–CBR acknowledged that
derivative actions are feasible in the
United States but did not award a “1”
because various restrictions apply,
such as a contemporaneous
ownership requirement (the plaintiff
must have owned shares at the time
the alleged breach of duty occurred),
a requirement that a plaintiff
typically make “demand” (ask the
board to sue), and judicial deference
to screening by special litigation
committees.251
Siems–CBR relied upon Delaware
case law to justify awarding “1.”252
The cases cited indicate that the
powers of the majority are “always
subject to the historical processes of
a court of equity to gauge whether

1

248. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (2015).
249. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
250. Those constructing the CBR SPI apparently inaccurately conflated dismissal as a
director with dismissal as an executive. The analysis of the “0.75” scoring for the United States
cited MBCA § 8.08(a), which specifically permits a corporation’s shareholders to dismiss a
director without cause, meaning the dismissed director will not be entitled to compensation, as
well as the provision in the Dodd-Frank Act that provided for an advisory “say on pay” vote.
SIEMS ET AL., supra note 238, at 106. Despite section 8.08(a), an individual who is an executive,
in addition to being a director, who is fired as an executive without cause, will be able to sue for
damages for wrongful termination from the executive position. It seems this possibility was
sufficient for Professor Siems and the CBR team to refrain from giving the United States (i.e.,
Delaware) a score of “1,” even though this scenario has nothing directly to do with director
dismissal. Citing of the “say on pay” rule introduced by Dodd-Frank is also confusing in that the
ability of shareholders to vote on executive compensation policy on an advisory basis has no
obvious connection with the feasibility of director dismissal.
251. SIEMS ET AL., supra note 238, at 105–07; SIEMS ET AL., supra note 111, at 105.
252. SIEMS ET AL., supra note 238, at 105–07; SIEMS ET AL., supra note 111, at 105.
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Mandatory Bid (score is
determined by the presence of
rules requiring a shareholder
who buys a designated
percentage of shares to make an
offer to buy the shares of all
remaining shareholders)
Disclosure of Major
Shareholder Ownership (equals
0.75 if shareholders who
acquire at least five percent of a
company’s shares have to
disclose their stake)

0

Total

7.5

0.75

[Vol. 68

there has been an oppressive exercise
of the power granted.”253
Neither Delaware nor federal law
requires an investor who acquires a
large stake in a company to make a
bid for all of the shares of the
company.254

Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 13(d) and Schedule 13D of the Act
combine to require those acquiring a
stake of five percent or more to
disclose their interest.255

In comparative terms, shareholders in Delaware corporations are wellprotected. Among the twenty countries in the Siems–CBR dataset for
2005, the United States, with its score of 7.25, tied for second best with
France, trailing slightly behind the United Kingdom at 7.375 and
substantially exceeding the average score of 5.2.256 Due to improved
shareholder protection elsewhere, the United States’ aggregate score of
7.5 for 2013 did not rank quite as highly as its 2005 score.257 Three
countries—China, Russia and France—each had scores exceeding the
U.S. aggregate, and the United Kingdom, Japan, and Slovenia all had
equivalent overall scores.258
While under the ADRI, the Illinois and Model Act present-day
aggregate scores diverge from Delaware’s,259 and the same occurs with
Illinois and the ASDI, with the CBR SPI260 as Table 10 indicates, all three
sources of law have present-day scores which are identical element-byelement. The fact that federal law (including stock exchange listing rules)
determined the relevant score with five variables and influenced the
scoring for a sixth contributed substantially to this uniformity.

253. Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198, 202 (D. Del. 1943), aff’d 146 F.2d
701 (3d Cir. 1944).
254. SIEMS ET AL., supra note 238, at 105–07; SIEMS ET AL., supra note 111, at 105.
255. Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101, Item 5(d)–(e).
256. See Armour et al., supra note 49, at 357 tbl.2 (calculating the average from figures
provided in Table 2).
257. SIEMS ET AL., supra note 238, at 105–07.
258. Katelouzou & Siems, supra note 101, at 133–34 & fig.1.
259. See supra Tables 3–4.
260. See supra Tables 7–8.
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Table 10: Illinois and Model Act Present-Day CBR SPI Scores
CBR SPI Element

Illinois/Model
Act Scores
(2013–present
day)

Justification for Present-Day
Score

Powers of the General Meeting
for de facto changes

0.75/0.75

Agenda Setting Power
Anticipation of Shareholder
Decision Facilitated
Prohibition of Multiple Voting
Rights
Independent Board Members
Feasibility of Director’s
Dismissal

1/1
1/1

IBCA § 11.60 has the same
standard as Delaware.261
Model Act § 12.02(a) in effect
requires a shareholder vote if less
than twenty-five percent of assets
will remain after a disposition.262
Federal securities law.263
NYSE listing rules and federal
securities law.264
NYSE listing rules.265

Private Enforcement of Director
Duties

0.75/0.75

0.5/0.5
1/1
0.75/0.75

NYSE listing rules.266
IBCA § 8.35 and Model Act
§ 8.08 both permit shareholders to
dismiss directors without cause,
but executives dismissed without
cause can still sue for
compensation.267 The Dodd-Frank
provisions concerning “say on
pay” amend federal securities
law.268
As is the case with Delaware,269
derivative actions are feasible
under the IBCA and the Model
Act but with similar limitations in
place, a “1” is not justified.270

261. See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11.60 (2015).
262. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 12.02(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
263. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a–7, 240.14a–8 (2016).
264. Id. § 240.14a-4; NYSE MANUAL, supra note 244, § 402.04.
265. NYSE MANUAL, supra note 244, § 313.00.
266. Id. § 303A.01.
267. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.35 (2015); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.08(a).
268. See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
269. See supra Table 9.
270. On the necessity of demand, see 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.80(b); MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT ANN. § 7.24(1). On special litigation committees, see Weiland v. Ill. Power Co., 1990 WL
267364 (C.D. Ill. 1990) (accepting the use of a special litigation committee); MODEL BUS. CORP.
ACT ANN. §§ 1.43, 7.44 (indicating that “qualified” directors lacking a material interest in the
challenged transaction can dismiss a derivative suit). On contemporaneous ownership, see 805
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.80(a); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.41(1).
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Shareholder Action Against
Resolutions of the General
Meeting
Mandatory Bid

1/1

Disclosure of Major
Shareholder Ownership
Total

0.75/0.75

0/0

[Vol. 68

Cases cited to justify a “1” for
Delaware are consistent with
general common law trends.271
The position is the same under
Illinois law and the Model Act as
it is for Delaware.272
Federal securities law.273

7.5/7.5

C. Historical Trends
This Section turns from the present day to historical trends. The
scoring for Delaware and Illinois for the ADRI, ASDI, and the CBR SPI
extends back to 1899. The start date for the Model Act is 1950 because it
was promulgated then.
1. ADRI
With four of the six ADRI variables it appears that the scores
remained unchanged going back through time—to 1899 in the case of
Delaware and Illinois and to 1950 for the Model Act. First, with voting
by proxy, just as is the case today, Delaware and Illinois corporate
legislation authorized shareholders to vote in this manner in 1899 without
requiring the proxy documentation to provide for “two-way” voting.274
The Model Act has done likewise since 1950.275
Second, our searches failed to reveal any historical evidence of
provisions in Delaware, Illinois, or the Model Act designed to block the
transfer of shares prior to shareholder meetings.276 Third, regarding the
oppressed minority variable, although Delaware courts did not
specifically confirm shareholders’ right to file derivative suits against
directors until the early 1920s,277 it was clearly available in Illinois as the
271. See Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., Corporate Fiduciary Principles for the PostContractarian Era, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 561, 573 & n.63 (1996) (treating the cases cited as
authoritative jurisprudence concerning recapitalizations involving preferred shareholders).
272. See supra Table 9.
273. Schedule 13D, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101, Item 5(d)–(e) (2016).
274. An Act Providing a General Corporation Law, ch. 273, § 20, 21 Del. Laws (1899)
(current version at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212 (2015)); 32 ILL. REV. STAT. § 3 (1874) (codified
as amended at 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.50).
275. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 31 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1950).
276. At various points in time, there were statutory provisions that gave a corporation’s
directors the power to close the stock transfer books prior to a shareholder meeting to fix who
could vote. See, e.g., DEL. REV. CODE ch. 65, § 17 (1925); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 28. These
measures, however, did not authorize the directors to preclude dealing in the shares.
277. Fleer v. Frank H. Fleer Corp., 125 A. 411, 414 (Del. Ch. 1924); Allied Chem. & Dye
Corp. v. Steel & Tube Co. of Am., 120 A. 486, 491 (Del. Ch. 1923).
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19th century drew to a close.278 More generally, the derivative suit was
available in the United States at least as early as 1831279 and was widely
understood to be a general feature of U.S. corporate law by the late-19th
century.280 Correspondingly, “1” is the appropriate score for Delaware
and Illinois from the present day back to 1899 and for the Model Act back
to 1950.
Finally, regarding a shareholder’s right to call a shareholder meeting,
Delaware did not statutorily regulate this topic until 1967 and has never
specifically authorized shareholders owning a designated percentage of
shares to call a meeting.281 While Illinois has empowered shareholders to
call shareholder meetings since 1872 and the ownership threshold was
reduced from two-thirds to twenty percent in 1933, the relevant figure has
always exceeded the ten-percent threshold required to receive a “1” under
the ADRI.282 The Model Act, in contrast, has since 1950 authorized
shareholders owning ten percent or more of a corporation’s shares to call
a meeting, thus meriting a “1.”283
Cumulative voting and preemptive rights are the two ADRI variables
where change has occurred, moving from “1” to “0” in each case. For
cumulative voting, the Model Act is the only legal regime affected, with
the score falling from “1” to “0” in 1969.284 Delaware specifically
authorized companies to “opt in” to this method of director selection in
1917 but never established cumulative voting as a default rule, meaning
its cumulative voting score has remained “0” from 1899 to the present
day.285 While Illinois displaced a long-standing mandatory cumulative
278. Wheeler v. Pullman Iron & Steel Co., 32 N.E. 420, 422–23 (Ill. 1892); City of Chi. v.
Cameron, 11 N.E. 899, 902–03 (Ill. 1887).
279. See Taylor v. Miami Exporting Co., 5 Ohio 162, 165–69 (1831). In Dodge v. Woolsey,
the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the derivative suit. 59 U.S. 331, 342 (1855). Dodge
subsequently became the leading case on derivative litigation. Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra
note 27, at 1749 n.68; Harwell Wells, A Long View of Shareholder Power: From the Antebellum
Corporation to the Twenty-First Century, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1033, 1048 (2015).
280. See, e.g., 1 VICTOR MORAWETZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 242 (2d ed. 1886).
281. An Act to Amend Chapter 1 of Title 8 of the Delaware Code, ch. 50, § 211(d), 56 Del.
Laws (1967) (codified as amended at DEL. CODE ANN. § 211(d) (2015)); Cheffins, Bank & Wells,
supra note 33 at 609 tbl.3.
282. See 32 ILL. REV. STAT. § 22 (1918) (current version at 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.05
(2015)) (requiring a two-third minimum of stockholders to call a meeting); Henry Winthrop
Ballantine, A Critical Survey of the Illinois Business Corporation Act, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 386
(1934) (noting that “[h]olders of not less than one-fifth of the outstanding shares may demand the
calling of a meeting”).
283. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 26 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1950).
284. On the chronology, see Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at 1750–51.
285. See An Act to Amend Chapter 65 of the Revised Code of Delaware, ch. 113, § 9, 29
Del. Laws (1917); Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 33, at 609 tbl.3.
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voting rule in favor of a presumptive rule in 1984,286 “1” remains the
appropriate score throughout because default rules are taken into account
when scoring with the ADRI.
All three jurisdictions experienced a change regarding preemptive
rights, with the score dropping from “1” to “0” in each instance. At
common law, shareholders had preemptive rights,287 meaning that as of
1899 Delaware and Illinois both scored “1” for this variable, and the
Model Act did likewise as of its inception in 1950. The inaugural version
of the Model Act expressly permitted shareholders to waive their
preemptive rights,288 as Delaware and Illinois had done since 1927 and
1933 respectively.289 These enabling measures were insufficient to
change a score of “1” to “0.” This occurred with Delaware, Illinois, and
the Model Act in 1967, 1982, and 1984 respectively when they each
eliminated preemptive rights unless the articles of incorporation provided
otherwise.290
Since all changes affecting the ADRI over time were from “1” to “0,”
the ADRI scores for Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Act inevitably
trended downward. Moreover, with changes only affecting two of the
ADRI variables, it was likely that changes to aggregate scores would be
modest. This indeed was the case with Delaware, where the only change
was from “4” to “3” (“3” to “2” using Spamann’s methodology) due to
the 1967 displacement of preemptive rights, as shown in Table 11.
Likewise, Illinois’s aggregate score fell from “5” to “4” (“4” to “3” using
Spamann’s methodology) in 1982 due to the same change. These findings
lend support to conjectures that meaningful competition between states
in the corporate law realm “has long since ended”291 and amounts not to
a race but a “leisurely walk.”292

286. Compare 32 ILL. REV. STAT. § 3 (1874), with 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.40 (1983)
(amended 1995). For a discussion of the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983 and its coming
into force in 1984, see James M. Van Vliet, Jr., The New Illinois Business Corporation Act Needs
More Work, 61 CHI. KENT. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1985).
287. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 133 (1932); Wells, supra note 66, at 610–11.
288. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 24.
289. An Act Proposing an Amendment to Article 2 of the Constitution of the State of
Delaware, ch. 85, § 5 para. 10, 35 Del. Laws (1927); ILL. BUS. CORP. ACT § 24 (1934).
290. DEL. CODE ANN. tit.8, § 102(b)(3) (1967); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/6.50 (2015) (effective
July 1, 1984); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 6.30(a), at 6-198 to 6-200 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013)
(indicating as well that a provision was added to the Model Act in 1955 providing for abolition of
preemptive rights that was set out as an alternative to the 1950 “opt out” approach).
291. Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55
STAN. L. REV. 679, 724 (2002).
292. Bebchuk & Hamdani, supra note 88, at 586.
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Table 11: Aggregate ADRI Scores—Delaware, Illinois, and Model
Act, 1899–Present293
Delaware
(DLLS–
Spamann)
Illinois
(DLLS–
Spamann)
Model Act
(DLLS–
Spamann)

1899

1950

1967

1969

1982

1984

4/3

4/3

3/2

3/2

3/2

3/2

Present
day
3/2

5/4

5/4

5/4

5/4

4/3

4/3

4/3

X

6/5

6/5

5/4

5/4

4/3

4/3

Under the Model Act, because of the 1984 displacement of
preemptive rights and the 1969 side-lining of cumulative voting, the
downward trend was more pronounced. However, the drop occurred from
a very high starting point. The Model Act’s ADRI aggregate score of “6”
for 1950 to 1969, following DLLS’s coding, exceeded the score of every
country DLLS considered when revising the ADRI. 294 With Spamann’s
recoding, only South Korea and Spain, with scores of “6,” exceeded the
Model Act’s 1950 to 1969 score of “5.”295
2. ASDI
With Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Act there has been little
change over time under the ASDI private control of self-dealing subindex. The mandating of shareholder approval and independent review of
related-party transactions, both of which are facets of the ex ante subindex, have never been features of state corporate law in the United
States. Correspondingly, for these variables a score a “0” is appropriate
going back through time.

293. Scoring changes are identified in bold.
294. See DLLS, supra note 36, at 432.
295. Spamann, supra note 40, at 475.
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Table 12: ASDI Ex Ante Private Control of Self-Dealing—
Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Act, 1899–Present296
ASDI Element

Approval by
Disinterested
Shareholders
Disclosure by
Buyer Co.
Disclosure by
Mr. James
Independent
Review
Ex Ante
Disclosure
Ex Ante Private
Control of SelfDealing

1899—
Delaware/
Illinois/
Model Act
0/0/x

1950—
Delaware/
Illinois/
Model Act
0/0/0

1984—
Present day—
Delaware/Illinois/ Delaware/Illinois/
Model Act
Model Act297
0/0/0

0/0/0

1/1/x

1/1/1

1/0298/1

1/0/1

1/1/x

1/1/1

1/0/1

1/0/1

0/0/x

0/0/0

0/0/0

0/0/0

0.67/0.67/x 0.67/0.67/0 0.67/0/0.67
.67
0.33/0.33/x 0.33/0.33/0 0.33/0/0.33
.33

0.67/0/0.67
0.33/0/0.33

Change did occur with respect to required disclosure by Mr. James
and Buyer Co. Although Delaware and the Model Act remained
unaffected, in Illinois the “safe harbor” provision ensuring that ex ante
disclosure was not even implicitly required only took effect in 1984 when
the IBCA came into force.299 Prior to this, the common law likely would
have required full disclosure before a court could exercise its discretion
to relieve parties of the adverse consequences potentially associated with
related-party transactions.300 Hence, the only change to the ex ante private
296. Scoring changes are identified in bold.
297. See supra Table 7.
298. Illinois initially had a statutory provision specifically governing related-party
transactions in 1981. ILL. BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 40a (1933). The enactment of this provision would
not have reduced Illinois’s disclosure by Buyer Co. and disclosure by Mr. James scores in the
same way as the 1983 IBCA because the 1981 provision specifically required disclosure of the
transaction to the board before a court could save the transaction. On the nature of the 1981
provision, see Church, supra note 213, at 746–47.
299. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8.60 (1983) (amended 1998). On the IBCA coming into force
in 1984, see supra note 286.
300. See Note & Comment, Corporations—Directors—Transactions Involving Conflicts of
Interest, 42 ORE. L. REV. 61, 64 (1962) (“A finding of nondisclosure will make a consideration of
other facets of a transaction unnecessary in most cases. Nondisclosure of an interest by a director
may constitute unfairness per se under the fairness test and thus make the transaction voidable.”
(footnote omitted)); Note, The Fairness Test of Corporate Contracts with Interested Directors,
61 HARV. L. REV. 335, 338 (1948) (“The courts usually require of the interested director full
disclosure of his interest and of those facts, such as his own purchase price, which would affect
the board’s decision to buy.”). With respect to Illinois, before 1984 there was conflicting case law
concerning related-party transactions, but in Shlensky v. South Parkway Building Corp., full
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control of self-dealing sub-index going back to 1899 was that Illinois’s
ex ante disclosure score fell from 0.67 to 0 in 1984, which in turn reduced
Illinois’s overall ex ante private control of self-dealing index score from
0.33 to 0.
As with the ex ante private control of self-dealing sub-index, the
scoring under the ex post sub-index only changed for one variable going
back through time, though that change was not restricted to only one
jurisdiction. The variable affected was “disclosure in public filings,” with
the relevant change occurring in 1935 when disclosure of material
contracts between a company and any of its directors or officers became
compulsory under federal securities law.301 The change more than
doubled Delaware and Illinois’s ex post private control of self-dealing
score and increased the overall anti-self-dealing sub-index score for both
jurisdictions from 0.41 to 0.65 .
Table 13: ASDI Ex Post Private Control of Self-Dealing—Delaware,
Illinois, and the Model Act, 1899–Present302
ASDI
Element

1899—
Delaware/Ill
inois/
Model Act

1935—
Delaware/
Illinois/
Model Act

1950—
Delaware/
Illinois/
Model Act

1984—
Delaware/
Illinois/
Model Act

Present
Day—
Delaware/
Illinois/
Model Act303

Disclosure in
Periodic Filings
Standing to Sue
Rescission
Ease of Holding
Mr. James
Liable
Ease of Holding
Approving
Body Liable
Access to
Evidence
Ease of Proving
Wrongdoing

0/0/x

1/1/x

1/1/1

1/1/1

1/1/1

1/1/x
1/1/x
1/1/x

1/1/x
1/1/x
1/1/x

1/1/1
1/1/1
1/1/1

1/1/1
1/1/1
1/1/1

1/1/1
1/1/1
1/1/1

1/1/x

1/1/x

1/1/1

1/1/1

1/1/1

0.75/0.75/x

0.75/0.75/x

0.75/0.75/0.75 0.75/0.75/0.75 0.75/0.75/0.75

0.95/0.95/x

0.95/0.95/x

0.95/0.95/0.95 0.95/0.95/0.95 0.95/0.95/0.95

Ex Post Private 0.48/0.48/x
Control of Selfdealing
Anti-self0.41/0.41/x
dealing Index

0.98/0.98/x

0.98/0.98/0.98 0.98/0.98/0.98 0.98/0.98/0.98

0.65/0.65/x

0.65/0.65/0.65 0.65/0.49/0.65 0.65/0.49/0.65

disclosure was identified as a factor that would determine the outcome of a fairness test. 66 N.E.2d
793, 802 (Ill. 1960); Church, supra note 213, at 746, 749–50.
301. Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at 1759.
302. Scoring changes are identified in bold.
303. See supra Table 8.
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For other variables in the ASDI ex post private control of self-dealing
sub-index, scores for “access to evidence” have remained unchanged over
time because Delaware and Illinois civil procedure rules as far back as
1899 provided for the same core litigant rights that justify the present-day
score of “0.75.”304 For the variables measuring standing to sue, rescission,
and the ease of holding Mr. James and the approving body (i.e., the board)
liable, current common law principles provide the justification for the
“1”s awarded to Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Act.305 The same
common law principles should have been applicable back to 1899.
Verifying this point definitively is admittedly not feasible. For instance,
Delaware lacked any case law directly focusing on related-party
transactions until the early 1920s.306 Still, the trend of authority from
other states should, in the absence of Delaware jurisprudence, provide a
reasonably accurate characterization of what the law would have been in
Delaware prior to that point.307
3. CBR SPI
With both the ADRI and the ASDI there were relatively few changes
to scores over time and, other than the 1935 introduction of the
requirement of ex post disclosure of related party transactions, what
changes there were all moved scores downwards. The situation was much
different with the CBR SPI. For the CBR SPI, as Figure 1 shows, the
aggregate score changed reasonably often and there was a marked upward
trend of aggregate scores. There were changes at the state level as far
back as 1903, with the pace of change increasing starting in 1950. As
Table 14 shows, each change at the state level, with two exceptions,
moved scores upward. Likewise, Table 15 shows that this trend was

304. On the right to request documents relevant to the case from the defendant, see DEL.
REV. STAT. ch. 30, § 13 (1893); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, § 9 (1874). On the right to examine the
defendant without a court approving the questions, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, §§ 1, 24–28 (setting
out rules for witnesses and indicating that parties were not excluded from being witnesses). On
the right to examine non-parties without a court approving the questions, see id. §§ 24–28 (1874);
DEL. CH. R. 40, 48 (1868) (allowing courts to enter an order of attachment against witnesses who
fail to testify after being duly summoned).
305. See supra Table 8.
306. See Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at 1762.
307. There was pre-1920s case law from New York indicating that individual shareholders
might lack standing to challenge related-party transactions. See id. at 1761–62. Even if this was
in fact the law, the doctrine was subject to sufficiently wide exceptions to suggest a “1” was the
appropriate score for standing to sue. See id.
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strongly reinforced by changes in federal securities law and NYSE listing
rules, which the SEC strongly influences.308
Figure 1: CBR SPI Aggregate Scores for Delaware, Illinois, and the
Model Act, 1899–Present
8
7
6
5
Delaware

4

Illinois

3

MBCA (1950 onwards)

2
1
1899
1903
1938
1940
1942
1950
1956
1968
1969
1970
1984
2002
2003
2011
2015

0

Table 14: Changes to CBR SPI Scores for Individual Variables
Generated by State Law—Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Act,
1899–Present
Year

CBR SPI
Variable

Jurisdiction(s)
Affected

Score
Change

Explanation

1903

Prohibition
of Multiple
Voting
Rights

Delaware

1 to 0

1950

X

Model Act

X

The DGCL of 1899 authorized
the issuance of share classes
with different voting rights, but
it only took full effect with the
1903 repeal of a provision in
the Delaware Constitution of
1897 which stated that “in all
elections for directors or
managers of stock corporations,
each shareholder shall be
entitled to one vote for each
share of stock he may hold.”309
Model Act first introduced.

308. Roe, supra note 19, at 11.
309. Brooks v. State ex rel. Richards, 79 A. 790, 800 (Del. 1911) (quoting DEL. CONST. OF
1897, art. 9, § 6).
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1969

Feasibility of
Director’s
Dismissal

Model Act

0 to 0.5

1970

Feasibility of
Director’s
Dismissal

Delaware

0.25 to
0.5

1982

Prohibition
of Multiple
Voting
Rights

Illinois

1 to 0.5

1984

Feasibility of
Director’s
Dismissal

Illinois

0 to 0.5

[Vol. 68

In 1960, the forerunner to the
current Model Act § 8.08 was
introduced as an “optional”
provision, and in 1969 the
optional designation was
removed.310 This displaced the
common law rule, which held
that shareholders could only
remove directors for cause,
reflecting the fact that the
directors had a statutory
entitlement to their office.311
The common law rule would
score a “0” under the CBR SPI
coding protocol.312
DGCL § 141(k) enacted,313
which the CBR SPI coders
relied upon to give Delaware
(the U.S.) a “0.5.”314
IBCA § 28 amended to allow
corporations formed after
December 31, 1981 to
eliminate voting rights attached
to shares, including those
relating to cumulative
voting.315
IBCA § 8.35 came into force,
displacing the common law
rules that offered shareholders
little, if any, scope to dismiss
directors.316

310. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.08(a), at 8-82 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013).
311. Id. at 8-81; 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 7, § 9:14, at 86, 91.
312. Under the “[f]easibility of director’s dismissal,” the CBR coders gave jurisdictions a
“0” if “good reason [was] required for the dismissal of directors.” Armour et al., supra note 49,
at 354 tbl.1.
313. An Act to Amend Chapter 1, Title 8, Delaware Code, ch. 437, § 5, 59 Del. Laws (1974)
(codified as amended at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2015)).
314. SIEMS ET AL., supra note 111, at 103–04 tbl.25. Prior to the enactment of Section 141(k),
the Delaware General Corporation Law contained a provision indicating that directors could be
removed, but it was unclear whether this had to be for cause. See Charles H. Nida, Note, The New
Delaware Corporation Law, 5 HARV. J. LEGIS. 413, 427 (1968). Delaware had a provision of this
sort going back to 1899. See Katharina Pistor et al., The Evolution of Corporate Law: A CrossCountry Comparison, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 791, 815 (2002). A pre-1970 score of “0.25”
appears to be appropriate, which the CBR SPI coders award when it is clear that a director can be
dismissed but would always be compensated. Armour et al., supra note 49, at 354 tbl.1.
315. See Roanoke Agency, Inc. v. Edgar, 461 N.E.2d 1365, 1368 (Ill. 1984).
316. See, e.g., Van Vliet, supra note 286, at 34 (“New BCA section 8.35 reflects a basic
public policy change, granting statutory authority for the removal of directors, with or without
cause, by shareholder action. There was no counterpart to this in the Old BCA so that, prior to the
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Private
Enforcement
of Director
Duties

Delaware,
Illinois, Model
Act317

0.5 to
0.75

743

The private enforcement of
directors’ duties score
increased due to case law
developments “evidenc[ing] a
heightening of judicial scrutiny
on directors in the wake of the
corporate governance
scandals.”318

Table 15: Changes to CBR SPI Scores for Individual Variables
Generated by Changes to Federal Law—Delaware, Illinois, and the
Model Act, 1899–Present
Year

CBR SPI
Variable

Jurisdiction(s)
Affected

Score
Change

Explanation

1938

Anticipation of
Shareholder
Decision
Facilitated

Delaware, Illinois

0.5 to 1

SEC Rule X-14A2, forerunner to
SEC Rule 14a4(b)(1), adopted.319

New BCA, only the common law right to remove a director for cause existed.”). The common
law rule generally applicable in U.S. states was that directors could only be removed before the
end of their terms “for cause,” but statute gradually replaced this rule beginning in the 1930s. See
HENRY WINTHROP BALLANTINE, BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS 433–34 (rev. ed. 1946). The law
may have remained restrictive in Illinois because, prior to the adoption of the 1983 Illinois
Business Corporation Act, “there was no statutory provision governing the removal of corporate
directors.” Voss Eng’g, Inc. v. Voss Indus., 481 N.E.2d 63, 66 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). At least one
Illinois court had earlier suggested that allowing shareholders to remove a director even for cause
would be inappropriate because this would permit an end-run around cumulative voting
requirements of the Illinois constitution. See Laughlin v. Geer, 121 Ill. App. 534, 538–39 (1905);
7 CHARLES W. MURDOCK, ILLINOIS PRACTICE SERIES: BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS § 11.18 (2d ed.
2015).
317. With this case law-driven change in scoring, each case cited was from Delaware. SIEMS
ET AL., supra note 111, at 105 tbl.25. However, given our policy of deferring to coding by those
who constructed the original indices and given the influential nature of Delaware case law, we
have assumed that the private enforcement of director duties score would increase with Illinois
and the Model Act as well as with Delaware.
318. Id. (quoting Jeffrey D. Hern, Comment, Delaware Courts’ Delicate Response to the
Corporate Governance Scandals of 2001 and 2002: Heightening Judicial Scrutiny on Directors
of Corporations, 41 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 207, 228 (2005)).
319. For a chronology of the SEC rules, see Sheldon E. Bernstein & Henry G. Fischer, The
Regulation of the Solicitation of Proxies: Some Reflections on Corporate Democracy, 7 U. CHI.
L. REV. 226, 229 (1940). On the pre-1938 scoring, according to the CBR SPI protocol, a “0.5” is
justified if postal or proxy voting is merely authorized. Armour et al., supra note 49, at 354 tbl.1.
State laws that justify a coding of “1” for Delaware and Illinois for the ADRI proxy voting variable
date back to 1899 should meet this threshold. See supra note 274 and accompanying text. The
CBR SPI coders cite a NYSE listing rule compelling companies to solicit proxies to justify the
“1” they give the United States with the “[a]nticipation of shareholder decision facilitated.” See
supra Table 9. The relevant NYSE listing rule was not introduced until 1959. Douglas C. Michael,
Untenable Status of Corporate Governance Listing Standards Under the Securities Exchange Act,

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2017

53

Florida Law Review, Vol. 68, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 1

744

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

1940

Prohibition of
Multiple Voting
Rights

Delaware320

0 to 0.5

1942

Agenda Setting
Power

Delaware, Illinois

0 to 1

1956

Independent
Board Members

Delaware, Illinois,
Model Act

0 to 0.25

1968

Disclosure of
Major
Shareholder
Ownership

Delaware, Illinois,
Model Act

0 to 0.5

[Vol. 68

The NYSE
introduced a rule
precluding the
listing of nonvoting common
stock.321
Shareholder
proposal
mechanism that is
now SEC Rule
14A-8 introduced
as rule X-14A-7.322
Companies listed
on the NYSE
required to have at
least two
independent
directors.323
The Williams Act
introduced
Securities
Exchange Act of
1934, § 13(d) and
Schedule 13D of
the Act, which
required

47 BUS. LAW. 1461, 1469 (1992); Thompson, Delaware, the Feds, and the Stock Exchange, supra
note 130, at 795.
320. Illinois’s score for this variable did not increase in 1940 because it was already “1” due
to a provision in the Illinois constitution prohibiting the use of share classes with different voting
rights for directors’ elections. See ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. XI, § 3 (“[I]n all elections for directors
or managers of incorporated companies, every stockholder shall have the right to vote . . . for the
number of shares of stock owned by him, for as many persons as there are directors or managers
to be elected, or to cumulate said shares, and give one candidate as many votes as the number of
directors multiplied by the number of his shares of stock, shall equal, or to distribute them on the
same principle among as many candidates as he shall think fit . . . .”). See Ballantine, supra note
282, at 385.
321. Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19C-4, 69 WASH.
U. L.Q. 565, 569 (1991). The NYSE had refused to list corporations with dual-class capitalizations
beginning in 1926 but did not adopt a formal rule forbidding such listings until 1940. JOEL
SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET: A HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION AND MODERN CORPORATE FINANCE 585–86 (3d ed. 2003).
322. George W. Dent, Jr., SEC Rule 14a-8: A Study in Regulatory Failure, 30 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 1, 3–4, 4 n.14 (1985) (describing the administrative history of Rule 14a-8); see also
Mortimer M. Caplin, Proxies, Annual Meetings and Corporate Democracy: The Lawyer’s Role,
37 VA. L. REV. 653, 668–70 (1951) (indicating that prior to 1942 the SEC commented that
companies should set shareholder proposals forth in proxy soliciting materials but only
specifically permitted a shareholder to submit a proposal at that point).
323. Michael, supra note 319, at 1469; Thompson, Delaware, the Feds, and the Stock
Exchange, supra note 130, at 794–95.
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1970

Disclosure of
Major
Shareholder
Ownership

Delaware, Illinois,
Model Act

0.5 to 0.75

2002

Independent
Board Members

Delaware, Illinois,
Model Act

0.25 to 1

2011

Dismissal of
Directors

Delaware, Illinois,
Model Act

0.5 to 0.75
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shareholders
owning ten percent
or more of the
shares of an issuer
governed by the
Act to disclose its
stake.324
Ownership
disclosure
threshold
applicable to
Securities
Exchange Act of
1934, § 13(d) and
Schedule 13D
reduced to five
percent.325
NYSE Manual,
§ 303A.01
adopted.326
The Dodd-Frank
Act of 2010
provided
shareholders with
the right to an
advisory “say on
pay” vote.327

D. Our Hypotheses Revisited
Distilling the findings thus far necessitates a return to the three
hypotheses Part II.A. specified. The first hypothesis (H1) presupposes a
state-driven race to the bottom and would be verified if scores fell in
relation to those elements of shareholder protection indices determined
by state law. The findings on balance confirm H1, but the trend is not
robust. With the ADRI, the aggregate scores for Delaware and Illinois did
drop when those jurisdictions displaced preemptive rights, but only by
one point out of six.328 The Model Act’s ADRI score fell by one point in

324. Williams Act, Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 2, 82 Stat. 454, 454 (1968) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (2012)).
325. Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 1, 84 Stat. 1497, 1497 (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 78m).
326. NYSE MANUAL, supra note 244, § 303A.01 (requiring companies to have “a majority
of independent directors”).
327. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
328. See supra Table 11.
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1969 and again by one in 1984, but the decline was from a very high
starting point.329
With the ASDI, because of its state law elements, there again was a
downward trend but continuity was the main theme. Between 1899 and
the present day, on only one occasion was there state law-driven change
to the index—the 1984 amendment to Illinois law that meant advance
disclosure of related-party transactions was no longer even implicitly
required.330 Finally, while under the ADRI and the ASDI changes to state
law reduced aggregate scores, under the CBR SPI, the trend was mixed.
State law-driven changes to this index affecting the use of share classes
with multiple voting rights caused the scores of Delaware and Illinois to
decline, while those relating to director dismissal and enforcement of
directors’ duties raised the scores of Delaware, Illinois, and the Model
Act.331 The upshot is that H1 is confirmed, but the trend was neither
robust nor entirely uniform.
The second and third hypotheses (H2 and H3) relate to the impact of
federal law on shareholder protection over time. H2 presupposes that
changes to federal law should bolster shareholder rights. The assumption
underlying H3 is that changes to federal law were significant enough to
outweigh any downward pressure resulting from a state-driven “race to
the bottom.”
H2 and H3 are strongly confirmed. Federal law was not taken into
account with the coding of the ADRI, and each of the changes to this
index that decreased Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Act’s aggregate
score correspondingly occurred at state, not federal, level. While federal
law was taken into account with the ASDI, state law primarily directed
scoring for private control of self-dealing.332 Still, with the one element
determined by federal law—disclosure in periodic filings—federal
reform drove scores upward in what was otherwise a very stable
environment over time.333
The impact of federal law was considerably more pronounced with
the CBR SPI. Unlike with the ADRI and the ASDI, federal law (defined
to include national stock exchange listing rules)334 had a major impact on
the CBR SPI’s scoring for Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Act, with
federal rules accounting for the scoring of five of its ten elements and

329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.

See supra text accompanying notes 294–95.
See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
See supra Table 14.
See supra Tables 7–8.
See supra text accompanying notes 301–04.
See supra notes 159–64 and accompanying text.
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influencing a sixth.335 Overall, the aggregate CBR SPI scores for each
jurisdiction increased markedly between 1938 and 2003,336 with changes
to federal law accounting for most of the upward movement.337 CBR SPI
trends correspondingly indicate that federal developments substantially
bolstered shareholder protection (H2) and more than cancelled out
whatever movement downward was associated with changes to state law
(H3).
III. “PRESENT-DAY” BIAS?
This study’s strong confirmation of H2 and H3 affirms the
significance of a theme that has recently moved to the forefront of the
literature on corporate law federalism, namely that the federal
government is an important player.338 The weak confirmation of H1,
combined with the strong confirmation of H2 and H3, runs contrary to a
much better established element of the received wisdom, this being that
competition between states eroded shareholder protection substantially
over time. The results indicate federal intervention more than outweighed
a weak trend in favor of diminution of shareholder protection at the state
level, meaning that on a net basis shareholder rights became more robust
over time.
While the historical findings cast doubt on the received wisdom that
jurisdictional competition resulted in a net erosion of shareholder rights
and confirm the accuracy of the more recent theory that federal
intervention has done much to shape shareholder protection, this
presupposes that the selected indices measure what was really occurring.
This cannot be taken for granted. Given the historical orientation of this
Article’s leximetric investigation, a source of particular concern is that
“present-day” bias taints the indices.
This Part elaborates initially on why present-day bias is potentially a
source of concern. It then carries out cross-checks, which indicate that
whatever bias exists is insufficient to compromise our findings
materially. We ultimately show that our historical analysis of corporate
law indices provides reliable evidence that the erosion of shareholder
protection under state law since 1900 has been modest and that a federally

335. The five variables were agenda-setting power, anticipation of shareholder decision
facilitated, prohibition of multiple voting rights, independent board members, and disclosure of
major shareholder ownership, and the sixth was dismissal of directors. See supra Tables 9 & 10.
With anticipation of shareholder decision facilitated, state law was potentially relevant as well.
See supra Table 14.
336. See supra Figure 1.
337. See supra Table 15.
338. See supra notes 18–21 and accompanying text.
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oriented surge in shareholder rights has been a significant countervailing
influence.
A. Reasons for Concern
Mathias Siems, often with co-authors, has on various occasions
suggested that when LLSV constructed the ADRI, they fell into a trap
that comparative lawyers seek to avoid, namely imposing one’s own
preconceptions on foreign legal systems.339 Siems maintains that LLSV’s
inclusion of cumulative voting in the ADRI—a topic historically widely
debated in the United States but not elsewhere—and the failure to account
for potentially shareholder-unfriendly rules that hinder removal of
directors betrays a pro-U.S. bias in the ADRI.340 Though plausible,
Siems’s conjectures do not fit the facts comfortably. If the ADRI was, as
Siems alleges, affected by a pro-U.S. bias, one might expect that this
would translate into high scores for the supposedly favored country. It is
true that under LLSV’s original ADRI, the United States did score “5”
out of “6.”341 However, under DLLS’s and Spamann’s ADRI recodings,
the U.S. aggregate score (“3” and “2” respectively) was substantially
below the average for the countries taken into account.342
Given that our leximetric analysis of corporate law focuses
exclusively on the United States, it is largely immaterial to our analysis
if the indices deployed here betray an implicit partiality for U.S. corporate
law. There is, however, another type of bias that potentially affects these
indices that could compromise the results, namely a tilt in favor of scores
increasing over time. Bias of this sort is a source of concern partly
because there are some variables in the indices we use where for
substantial periods of time contemporaries would have been unaware that
regulating the topic in question might have been beneficial for investors.
Under such circumstances, the law governing U.S. corporations could not
realistically generate positive scores for these variables. This could only
begin to change when the value of the rules in question was recognized,
which in turn would tend to bias upward scores from recent decades, with
scores rising as the new rules were introduced.
The CBR SPI variable concerning the mandating of a designated
proportion of independent directors on the board is an example of an
index element with a present-day bias. In 1934, future-Justice William O.
Douglas was among the first to advocate that individuals not affiliated
339. See Armour et al., supra note 49, at 349; Lele & Siems, supra note 29, at 20–21; Mathias
M. Siems, What Does Not Work in Comparing Securities Laws: A Critique on La Porta et al’s
Methodology, 16 INT’L COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 300, 301 (2005).
340. Lele & Siems, supra note 28, at 20–21.
341. LLSV, supra note 35, at 1119, 1130.
342. Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 33, at 606, 608.
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with management occupy a majority of board seats.343 Thus, it would be
unrealistic to expect that the law governing U.S. corporations would have
generated a positive score for this variable before that point.
Even setting to one side the independent director variable, the CBR
SPI seems particularly susceptible to present-day bias given that its
creators selected topics they thought would form the core of international
corporate governance “best practice” between 1995 and 2005.344 In so
doing, as they explicitly acknowledged, they intentionally focused on a
period when change was on the policy agenda in numerous countries.345
Given this, it should not be surprising that, consistent with the 1995-2005
trend for most of the twenty countries Siems–CBR coded over that
period,346 the CBR SPI scores for Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Act
increased by a full point out of ten between 2001 and 2003.347 For the
period between 2006 and 2013, the CBR SPI scores for these jurisdictions
increased again but only by a modest 0.25, opening the way for a number
of countries to draw level with or pass the United States.348
Present-day bias, in the form of index components with a strongly
modern orientation, is, however, by no means an endemic feature of the
indices this Article focuses on. For many of the components, it was
theoretically possible for scores to be positive back to 1900. The “5” that
Illinois had as early as 1899 using DLLS’s ADRI scoring method and the
very high scores the Model Act had when it was introduced in 1950
indicate that at least for the ADRI, “1”s have been more than a theoretical
possibility for decades.349
Another potential source of upward present-day bias with these
indices comes from shareholder protections that may have previously
existed but are no longer part of shareholder rights discourse. Due to their
outdated nature, these legal protections would be unlikely candidates for
inclusion in the ADRI, ASDI, and CBR SPI. The indices, therefore, may
not capture significant shareholder protections that existed in 1900, 1910,
or 1920 but are largely unknown today. Correspondingly, reforms that
compromised, eroded, or abolished such rights could have diminished
343. See William O. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305, 1314–
15 (1934) (advocating the introduction of legislation mandating that stockholders independent of
management should make up a majority of the board). For a discussion of Justice Douglas’s
pioneer status, see Bratton & McCahery, supra note 129, at 661 (“Douglas’ article set out the
basic terms of the governance agenda that has guided corporate law reform ever since.”). Robert
Gordon was another early advocate of mandating the appointment of independent directors.
ROBERT AARON GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP IN THE LARGE CORPORATION 347–50 (1945).
344. Armour et al., supra note 49, at 355, 374.
345. See id. at 353, 355.
346. Siems, supra note 29, at 122–23.
347. See supra Figure 1.
348. See supra notes 256–58 and accompanying text.
349. See supra Table 11.
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shareholder protection without reducing historical scores for Delaware,
Illinois, or the Model Act. This historical leximetric exercise could in turn
fail to capture the abrogation or abolition of potentially significant
shareholder rights. The next Section accounts for this aspect of presentday bias.
B. What Shareholder Rights Mattered in 1929?
A plausible cross-check against present-day bias in the indices is to
identify what shareholder rights were thought to matter in the past and
ascertain whether these have been eroded over time. Conducting such an
exercise is not straightforward because those writing about corporate law
in the opening decades of the 20th century were not constructing indices
in the same way as LLSV, DLLS, and Siems–CBR. However, a 1929
book by John Sears, The New Place of the Stockholder,350 provides a
helpful substitute.
Sears indicated that the purpose of his book “[was] to consider
methods and practices proposed to protect the stockholder, use the
stockholder, and help the stockholder.”351 He identified as a departure
point “an understanding of the deeply fundamental character of the
stockholder’s legal rights”352 and then composed a fourteen-point “list of
strict legal rights, powers, and remedies” so “[t]hat we may more clearly
understand where we stand.”353 This fourteen-point list can be used to
capture a historically sensitive sense of trends concerning shareholder
protection.
If it transpired that there had been in the decades following the 1929
publication of Sears’ book a substantial erosion of the protections Sears
identified, this would suggest that the indices we have relied upon are
seriously compromised by present-day bias. Our findings
correspondingly would have to be discounted considerably. As we will
see, the legal rights on Sears’ list remain largely intact today and to the
extent they have been displaced the indices we use reflect the change. It
follows that that the trends we have identified in fact are robust.
Sears’ book would subsequently be overshadowed by Adolf Berle and
Gardiner Means’ landmark 1932 volume, The Modern Corporation and
Private Property.354 Nevertheless, as Professor Lawrence Mitchell has

350. JOHN H. SEARS, THE NEW PLACE OF THE STOCKHOLDER (1929).
351. Id. at 9.
352. Id. at 8.
353. Id. at 198.
354. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 287. For examples of other over-shadowed books, see
Robert Hessen, The Modern Corporation and Private Property: A Reappraisal, 26 J.L. & ECON.
273, 279 & n.20 (1983) (citing THOMAS NIXON CARVER, THE PRESENT ECONOMIC REVOLUTION IN
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observed, Sears’ views “were taken seriously” at the time of
publication.355 The Wall Street Journal referred to The New Place of the
Stockholder as “[o]ne of the most timely books of recent date,”356 and the
Boston Globe described the book as “worthy” and of “genuine interest
and value” to every stockholder.357 At least one reviewer of The Modern
Corporation and Private Property explicitly acknowledged Sears’ book
as a forerunner of Berle and Means’ work.358 In fact, Means cited The
New Place of the Stockholder in a 1930 article that Berle and Means drew
upon heavily in The Modern Corporation and Private Property.359 Sears’
catalog of protections available to shareholders in 1929 thus can serve as
a fair measure of the rights shareholders assumed to be relevant at that
moment.
With two items on Sears’ fourteen-point list—cumulative voting and
preemptive rights—shareholder protections available in 1929 were
eroded in subsequent decades. In both instances, however, the topics in
question have been taken into account for present purposes because, as
Table 16 indicates, they are ADRI components. For every item on Sears’
list that the ADRI did not deal with, the rights Sears cited remain
available to shareholders today (see Table 17). This suggests that even if
there is an element of present-day bias in the indices used, findings
presented here concerning shareholder protection trends remain valid.
Table 16: Elements of Sears’ Fourteen-Point List of Shareholder
Rights That Were Also ADRI Components—ADRI Trends
Shareholder Right,
Identified by
Number of Sears’
List

Sears’
Description

ADRI
Component

ADRI Trend

Right to Vote (#7)—
Proxy Voting

“The right
to . . . vote by
proxy . . . is
provided by statute

Vote by Proxy
Allowed

DLLS: Delaware
“1” (1899–present);
Illinois “1” (1899–
present); Model Act
“1” (1950–present)

THE UNITED STATES (1925),

WILLIAM Z. RIPLEY, MAIN STREET AND WALL STREET (1929), and I.
MAURICE WORMSER, FRANKENSTEIN, INCORPORATED (1931)).
355. Lawrence E. Mitchell, The “Innocent Shareholder”: An Essay on Compensation and
Deterrence in Securities Class-Action Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 243, 273.
356. New Publications: New Place of the Stockholder, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 1929, at 20.
357. Worthy Work Treats of Stockholders’ Rights, DAILY BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 7, 1929, at 4.
358. Robert S. Stevens, The Modern Corporation and Private Property, 18 CORNELL L.Q.
634, 634 (1933) (reviewing BERLE & MEANS, supra note 287).
359. Gardiner C. Means, The Diffusion of Stock Ownership in the United States, 44 Q.J.
ECON. 561, 561 & n.1 (1930); see also Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Preface to BERLE & MEANS, supra
note 287, at vi (noting Berle and Means’ reliance on this research).
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and court
decisions.”360

Cumulative Voting (#8)

Preemptive Rights
(#11)

Derivative Action (#12)

“To accumulate his
votes in the election
of directors, when
statute or state
constitution make
this right
compulsory, and to
do so where such
right is permissive
and the certificate of
incorporation, etc.,
provides
therefor.”362
“Preemptive right to
participate in new
issue upon increase
of capital stock.”364

Cumulative
Voting

“To bring legal
actions, in a
representative
capacity for all the
stockholders, in the
event directors are
acting fraudulently
in withholding
suit . . . .”366

Oppressed
Minority

Preemptive
Rights

[Vol. 68

Spamann: Delaware
“0” (1899–present);
Illinois “0” (1899–
present); Model Act
“0” (1950–
present)361
Delaware “0”
(1899–present);
Illinois “1” (1899–
present); Model Act
“1” (1950–69), “0”
(1969–present)363

Delaware “1”
(1899–1967), “0”
(1967–present);
Illinois “1” (1899–
1982), “0” (1982–
present); Model Act
“1” (1950–84), “0”
(1984–present)365
Delaware “1”
(1899–present);
Illinois “1” (1899–
present); Model Act
“1” (1950–
present)367

360. SEARS, supra note 350, at 202.
361. See supra Subsection II.B.1; Table 4 (Delaware scores); Table 5 (Illinois scores); Table
6 (Model Act scores).
362. SEARS, supra note 350, at 202.
363. See supra notes 284–86 and accompanying text.
364. SEARS, supra note 350, at 202.
365. See supra notes 287–90 and accompanying text.
366. SEARS, supra note 350, at 202.
367. See supra notes 276–80 and accompanying text.
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Table 17: Additional Elements of Sears’ Fourteen-Point List of
Shareholder Rights—Present-Day Situation
Shareholder Right,
Identified by
Number of Sears’
List

Sears’ Description

Present-Day Situation
(Delaware, Illinois, Model
Act)

Ultra vires (#1)

“Every stockholder, however
small, has the right to insist
that the purposes of the
corporation be confined to
those stated in the charter.”368
“To make amendments, to
alter the charter, the statutes
require the vote of holders of
various proportions of
stock.”370
“Power in the stockholders to
call meetings, in the event
that the regularly constituted
officers fail to do so, is
usually provided by
statute.”372
“Stockholders, usually by a
two-thirds vote at a
meeting . . . may dissolve the
corporation . . . .”374
“After the payment of
corporate debts, the

Individual shareholders have
standing to challenge ultra vires
transactions if it would be
equitable.369

Shareholder Voting on
Charter Amendments
(#2)

Calling Stockholder
Meetings (#3)

Power to Dissolve (#4)

Right to Assets on
Dissolution (#5)

Shareholder approval is
generally required for
corporations to amend their
articles of incorporation.371
Where corporate legislation
requires an annual shareholder
meeting, individual shareholders
have the right to demand that an
annual meeting be held.373
“Every state provides for the
voluntary dissolution of a
corporation when authorized by
a vote of the shareholders.”375
A key duty of directors during
the winding-up process for a

368. SEARS, supra note 350, at 198.
369. COX & HAZEN, supra note 7, § 4:8, at 241; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 124(1)
(2015); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3.15(a) (2015); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 3.04(b)(1) (AM.
BAR ASS’N 2013). With the rise of general incorporation laws and broad corporate purpose
clauses, ultra vires was largely a vestigial doctrine by the 1920s. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP,
ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, at 59–62 (1991).
370. SEARS, supra note 350, at 200. Procedurally amending the articles required the directors
to submit a proposal to the shareholders. See, e.g., DEL. CORP. LAWS § 26 (1915); 32 ILL. COMP.
STAT. § 62 (1929).
371. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10.20; MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 10.03(b).
372. SEARS, supra note 350, at 200.
373. 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 7, § 13:13, at 482–84; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 211(b); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/7.05; MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 7.01.
374. SEARS, supra note 350, at 200–01. At the time of publication of Sears’ book, the
procedure for the dissolution of a corporation in both Illinois and Delaware called for the board
to present a dissolution proposal to their shareholders. Shareholders, however, could request the
proposal. See DEL. CORP. LAWS § 39; 32 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 75.
375. 4 COX & HAZEN, supra note 7, § 26:2, at 295; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275
(2015); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12.15 (2015); MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 14.02 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2010).
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stockholder becomes entitled
to his proportionate share of
the assets of the
company.”376
Right to Sell Stock (#6)

“The right of alienation is an
inseparable incident to the
ownership of stock as it is of
other property.”378

Right to Vote (#7)

“The stockholder is normally
entitled to one vote for each
share of stock . . . .”380
“A well-known law writer
[I.M. Wormser] believes that
where it appears that
dividends have erroneously
and unfairly been detained
from distribution to the
stockholders for a long
period of years, a point will
be reached where a court of
equity should unhesitatingly
intervene . . . .”382
If the board’s power to
defend suits that have been
brought against the
corporation is “fraudulently
neglected, a stockholder
might conceivably act on
behalf of and in defense of
the corporation.”384
“A bona fide minority
stockholder who has
not . . . ratified fraudulent
acts of the majority . . . may
sue and will be given
appropriate remedies against

Right to Dividends (#9)

Defend Suits on Behalf
of the Corporation
(#13)

Remedy Against
Misconduct by
Majority Shareholders
(#14)

376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.

[Vol. 68

corporation is “to distribute the
remaining assets to the
shareholders of the corporation
after provision has been made for
creditors.”377
“In publicly held corporations,
free alienation of shares is a
distinct advantage of the
corporate form of doing
business.”379
“Generally, . . . each outstanding
share of stock is entitled to one
vote . . . .”381
With dividends, “[t]he
shareholders are usually entitled
to the amounts credited to
them . . . . In most cases where
dividends have been compelled,
it has been shown that the
directors wilfully abused their
discretion . . . .”383

“[R]efusal to defend [by the
board], where it partakes more of
disregard of duty than of an error
of judgment, or is a breach of
trust although not involving
intentional moral delinquency,
warrants relief to complaining
shareholders.”385
“In broad overview, transactions
shown to produce
disproportionate gains to the
controlling stockholders are
typically judged by a standard of
fairness . . . . [T]he burden of
establishing the fairness of the

SEARS, supra note 350, at 201.
4 COX & HAZEN, supra note 7, § 26:13, at 332.
SEARS, supra note 350, at 201.
COX & HAZEN, supra note 7, § 1:5, at 16.
SEARS, supra note 350, at 201.
ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 361 (1986).
SEARS, supra note 350, at 134 (footnote omitted).
3 COX & HAZEN, supra note 7, §§ 20:1–20:2, at 482, 491.
SEARS, supra note 350, at 202.
12B WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA
CORPORATIONS § 5853 (West 2015) (footnotes omitted).
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transaction is placed upon the
controlling stockholder . . . .”387

C. What Shareholder Protections Were Displaced?
While the ADRI, ASDI, and CBR SPI scores for Delaware, Illinois,
and the Model Act indicate there was only a modest erosion of protection
afforded to shareholders under state corporate law from 1899 onward,
and although the shareholder rights identified as important by Sears in
1929 remain largely intact today, the literature across the decades
abounds with claims that changes to state law markedly compromised
shareholder rights. Perhaps, then, neither the leximetric investigation
presented here nor the historical cross-check using Sears’ fourteen-point
list has captured fully what in fact was a prevalent trend in U.S. corporate
law. Correspondingly, this Section identifies changes to the law
emphasized by those who claim shareholder protection afforded by state
law diminished considerably and assesses whether these changes were of
sufficient importance to undermine our ADRI, ASDI, and CBR SPI
findings.
Throughout the 20th century, there were numerous assertions that
competition between states placed shareholder rights in jeopardy. In
1929, Berle stated that unless managerial power was subject to equitable
control by the courts “the interest of anyone who purchases or contracts
in respect of shares of a Delaware corporation is so hazardous from a
legal point of view that no well informed person would care to run the
risk.”388 In a 1930 Atlantic Monthly article, John Flynn said that the
states’ laws were liberal “to the point of glaring laxity.”389 Future JusticeWiley Rutledge observed in 1937 that numerous states were following
“the lead of Delaware,” meaning that “[t]he individual shareholder now
has largely a ‘pig-in-a-poke.’ His old vested rights are gone or are going.
He is made more dependent with each new statute upon the desires of the
management . . . .”390
In 1968, Professor Ernest Folk, who played a leading role in the
revision of Delaware corporate law that led to the enactment of the DGCL
of 1967, said of the approach taken, “We do not seek to protect
shareholders or creditors or others; rather we limit their rights and
386. SEARS, supra note 350, at 202.
387. 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 7, § 11:11, at 306–07.
388. A. A. Berle, Jr., Investors and the Revised Delaware Corporation Act, 29 COLUM. L.
REV. 563, 580–81 (1929).
389. John T. Flynn, Why Corporations Leave Home, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1932, at
268, 272.
390. Wiley B. Rutledge, Jr., Significant Trends in Modern Corporation Statutes, 22 WASH.
U. L.Q. 305, 337 (1937).
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remedies. We constantly enlarge the rights and freedom of
management.”391 Finally, Professor William Cary, in a landmark 1974
article on regulatory competition’s impact on corporate law, indicated
that “the race for the bottom” had “watered the rights of shareholders visà-vis management down to a thin gruel.”392
What forms of shareholder protection were abrogated or compromised
to elicit such forceful rhetoric? Throughout the 20th century, there were
various changes to the law both in Delaware and elsewhere that bolstered
managerial freedom of action. Did these compromise shareholder rights
in the profound manner implied by the “race” rhetoric used in relation to
regulatory competition by states? An analysis of major changes in state
corporation law across the century suggests not.
Within two years of Delaware’s 1899 enactment of a new general
incorporation statute designed to attract incorporation business,393
Delaware was revising the legislation to enhance managerial flexibility,
adding a new section permitting a corporation’s certificate of
incorporation to contain any provision not demonstrably in violation of
the statute.394 The process continued in 1917, when Delaware explicitly
authorized directors to sell all or substantially all of a corporation’s assets
so long as a majority vote of the shareholders approved such action.395
Also, following a precedent set by New York in 1912,396 in 1917
Delaware allowed corporations to issue shares with no par value.397 In
1928, Berle claimed that the institution of no-par stock was “[p]robably
the greatest single step in transferring control of property rights from
stockholders to corporate managements.”398 This change to the law did
theoretically make it easier for directors to benefit favored investors
inappropriately by issuing new shares cheaply.399 Still, the salutary
391. Ernest L. Folk, III, Some Reflections of a Corporation Law Draftsman, 42 CONN. B.J.
409, 409, 415 (1968). On Professor Folk’s role in the lawmaking process, see generally Comment,
Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861, 865–
68 (1969).
392. Cary, supra note 11, at 666.
393. Cheffins, Bank & Wells, Questioning, supra note 33, at 605.
394. S. Samuel Arsht, A History of Delaware Corporation Law, 1 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 9
(1976).
395. See id. at 10 (indicating that the amendment to the Delaware law was made in response
to a court decision that raised a doubt as to whether a company could sell all of its assets with less
than unanimous shareholder approval).
396. See Wells, supra note 66, at 606.
397. THE CORPORATION TRUST COMPANY, BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNDER THE LAWS OF
DELAWARE: SHARES WITHOUT PAR VALUE 14 (4th ed. 1917).
398. ADOLF A. BERLE, JR., STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATION FINANCE 64 (1928).
399. For an overview of the perceived risks created by no-par stock, see Wells, supra note
66, at 607.
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flexibility of no-par value shares quickly became apparent,400 and by the
time the 20th century drew to a close, par value was an anachronism.401
Otherwise, few amendments were made to Delaware’s corporation
statute until the late 1920s, when legislators made major changes to
provisions governing corporation finance.402 At this time, Delaware
corporations were explicitly authorized to issue stock options and to
create large blocks of authorized but unissued “blank stock” for which
managers could “tailor the rights and preferences of any class of stock to
meet market conditions” at the time of issuance.403 Professor Berle
characterized these and related changes to the Delaware legislation as
“dangerous” and “unworkable.”404 Stock options, however, were already
popular by the time Delaware changed its rules,405 and within a few
decades blank stock provisions were commonplace in corporate laws.406
The 1933 Illinois Business Corporations Act, befitting a statutory
measure that was supposed to protect shareholders from ongoing
abuses,407 did not bolster managerial discretion or erode shareholder
rights dramatically as compared with other legislation of the time. For
instance, the 1933 IBCA preserved preemptive rights even though the
California General Corporation Law of 1931 had set a precedent for
abolition of such rights.408 The Illinois Act likewise retained mandatory
cumulative voting even though Delaware never went further than
authorizing companies to “opt in” to this method of director selection in
1919.409 Similarly, while Delaware explicitly authorized the issuance of
stock options in the 1920s, the 1933 Illinois Act did not. It also provided
400. See, e.g., BALLANTINE, supra note 316, at 473 (“The great feature of no-par shares is
price flexibility . . . .”).
401. Venture Stores, Inc. v. Ryan, 678 N.E.2d 300, 303 (Ill. Ct. App. 1997); 3 COX & HAZEN,
supra note 7, § 16:15, at 315 (“‘Par value’ is a rapidly vanishing feature of corporate law.”); cf.
BAYLESS MANNING WITH JAMES J. HANKS, JR., LEGAL CAPITAL 30 (3d ed. 1990) (“[P]ar stock
continues to be in majority use.”).
402. Arsht, supra note 394, at 10–11.
403. Id. at 11; accord Berle, supra note 388, at 565–66 (discussing Delaware corporate law
in the late 1920s).
404. Berle, supra note 388, at 579.
405. John C. Baker, Stock Options for Executives, 19 HARV. BUS. REV. 106, 106 (1940)
(indicating that stock options “became exceedingly popular during the 1920’s”).
406. See E. R. Latty, Some General Observations on the New Business Corporation Law of
New York, 11 BUFF. L. REV. 591, 597 (1962).
407. See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
408. See Ballantine, supra note 282, at 362–63.
409. See ILL. REV. STAT. § 28 (1933) (repealed 1983); supra text accompanying note 315.
But see Wesley G. Nissen, Note, The Constitutionality of the 1983 Illinois Business Corporation
Act’s Voting Provisions, 1985 U. ILL. L. REV. 647, 647 (noting that the Advisory Committee to
the Secretary of State on the Illinois Business Corporation Act of 1983 found the 1933 provision
for mandatory cumulative voting harmful for economic growth).
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directors with less scope to carry out share buy-backs and declare
dividends than Delaware offered.410 Illinois then refrained from revising
its incorporation statute substantially until the enactment of the IBCA of
1983.411
Between 1929 and 1967, Delaware periodically tweaked its corporate
law statute but did not disturb the basic structure of the legislation412 until
concerns arose in the mid-1960s that its dominant position might be under
threat from other states seeking to compete for incorporations by
changing their laws to “‘out-Delaware’ Delaware.”413 Delaware enacted
a revised statute in 1967 referred to by one critic as “a modern round of
state charter-mongering” 414 and by another as “a prime exemplar of the
trend away from shareholder control.”415 Whether such forceful rhetoric
was justified is doubtful. Section II.C. has already canvassed some key
changes made by the 1967 legislation, namely the displacement of the
presumptive rule concerning the existence of preemptive rights and, in
the related-party transaction context, the approval by informed,
disinterested directors being statutorily deemed to have “the same
insulating effect as a good faith shareholder vote.”416 Other amendments
cited by commentators arguing the 1967 Act diluted shareholder rights
substantially were hardly radical. The amendments cited only
compromised in some respects the scope for appraisal rights in companies
registered on a national stock exchange or having more than 2,000
shareholders417 and empowered corporations to purchase directors’ and
officers’ insurance.418
Delaware has not engaged in a wholesale revision of its corporation
statute since 1967. In the ensuing decades, the 1986 enactment of
410. See Ballantine, supra note 282, at 363, 365, 369.
411. See Van Vliet, supra note 286, at 2–3.
412. Arsht, supra note 394, at 11.
413. See Joel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware’s General Corporation Law of 1899, 1
DEL. J. CORP. L. 249, 279 (1976) (quoting interviews with Samuel Arsht, Partner, Morris, Nichols,
Arsht & Tunnell, in Wilmington, Del. (Jan. 15, 1975), and Margaret Storey, Executive Vice
President, Corporation Service Company, in Wilmington, Del. (Jan. 16, 1975)).
414. Id.
415. Comment, Vestiges of Shareholder Rights Under the New Delaware Corporation Law,
57 GEO. L.J. 599, 599 (1969).
416. On preemptive rights, see supra note 76 and related discussion. On Delaware’s safe
harbor provision, see supra note 211 as well as Cheffins, Bank & Wells, supra note 27, at 1760.
417. See Comment, supra note 391, at 872–73; Comment, supra note 415, at 608–09. These
commentators used sweeping language to characterize the change. Comment, supra note 391, at
873 (“[E]ffectively eliminat[ing] appraisal rights . . . .”); Comment, supra note 415, at 609
(“Modification of the appraisal right . . . [would be] preferable to its abolition.”). By doing this,
they glossed over the fact that appraisal rights were preserved in a stock-for-stock merger, which
is still current law. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(2) (2015).
418. Comment, supra note 391, at 884–85; Comment, supra note 415, at 603.
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Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL has been the manager-friendly change to
Delaware law that has attracted the most attention.419 Delaware enacted
this provision, which authorizes Delaware corporations to limit or
eliminate personal liability for directors arising from breaches of the duty
of care,420 in response to concerns that honest directors were exposed to
a substantial and unjustified risk of personal liability and that the cost of
directors’ and officers’ insurance was escalating counterproductively.421
Given that the substantive content of directors’ duties is not addressed in
a general way by the ADRI, ASDI, or CBR SPI, these indices do not
capture this change to the law.
One other area where the ADRI, ASDI, and CBR SPI might not
capture significant changes in shareholder protection concerns states’
anti-takeover statutes. Following an unprecedented burst of hostile
takeover activity in the 1980s, a majority of states adopted statutes that
empowered boards to impede unwelcome takeover bids by, for instance,
allowing boards to take into account “other constituents” beyond
shareholders in making business decisions and temporarily removing
would-be acquirers’ voting rights.422 Anti-takeover statutes seemingly
reduced shareholder value.423 Therefore, the indices deployed here may
have missed an area where shareholder protection was significantly
weakened over time.
On the other hand, the anti-takeover measures adopted in the 1980s
arguably did not mark a fundamental departure from historical trends but
rather merely confirmed that boards had substantial discretion to thwart
takeover attempts. For instance, in Delaware—admittedly a state that
belatedly adopted a relatively weak anti-takeover statute and one where
the courts largely made takeover law—takeover doctrine developed

419. Brown, supra note 11, at 331–32 (treating the provision as manager-friendly); Edward
P. Welch & Robert S. Saunders, Freedom and Its Limits in the Delaware General Corporation
Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 845, 854 (2008) (“[T]he most significant post-1967 amendment . . . .”).
420. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7).
421. See James L. Griffith, Jr., Director Oversight Liability: Twenty-First Century Standards
and Legislative Controls on Liability, 20 DEL. J. CORP. L. 653, 688–89 (1995); Stephen A. Radin,
‘Smith v. Van Gorkom’ on its 15th Anniversary, DIRECTORS & BOARDS, Spring 2000, at 24, 27.
422. See Subramanian, supra note 66, at 1827–28 (providing summaries of anti-takeover
statutes for the various states); see also Michal Barzuza, The State of State Antitakeover Law, 95
VA. L. REV. 1973, 2040–46 (2009) (providing tables showing states with “directors’ duties
statutes” and states following Delaware’s standards).
423. Subramanian, supra note 66, at 1800 (“Econometric analyses of these statutes
consistently find that they reduce shareholder wealth . . . .”); see also Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does
the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1801 (2002)
(“[A] typical antitakeover statute has a negative, albeit modest, effect on shareholder value . . . .”).
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during the 1980s may ultimately have circumscribed rather than
enhanced board discretion.424
The foregoing synopsis indicates that while some significant
shareholder protections were eroded from 1900 onwards, the changes
were not dramatic compared to changes to the legal rules this Article has
already taken into account by performing a historical analysis with the
ADRI, ASDI, CBR SPI, and Sears’ fourteen-point list. Correspondingly,
while amendments to state law may have diminished shareholder
protection to some degree, at least from 1900 onwards, the “race”
terminology applied to trends concerning state corporate law is somewhat
hyperbolic.
It is possible that focusing on changes to the law occurring in the 20th
century may not be the appropriate way to ascertain why there was a
general consensus that competition between states for incorporation
business caused a substantial erosion of shareholder rights. This is
because affirmative statutory shareholder protection may never have
been a prominent feature of 20th-century state corporate law. The two
pivotal themes in the New Jersey corporation law of 1896—from which
Delaware’s 1899 statute was derived—were the removal of limits
formerly imposed on corporations and the dramatic increase in the scope
that incorporators and directors had, relative to shareholders, to dictate
the internal structure and operation of corporations.425 As far back as
1899, then, Delaware’s general incorporation statute failed to specify in
any systematic way the responsibilities of management to shareholders
or afford to dissident shareholders substantial rights and remedies.426
Correspondingly, the “race” that has ostensibly characterized the
development of shareholder protections under state corporate law may
have been largely over just as it started.
This revised characterization of the chronology of state corporate law
is not novel. Professors William Bratton and Joseph McCahery have said
that “[l]egislative innovation at the state level never again reached the
intensity experienced in the wake of New Jersey’s competitive
initiative.”427 They have similarly observed that “the structure of state
424. Ahdieh, supra note 9, at 299–300 (“Enthusiasts of federalism . . . have pointed to
reductions in the level of resistance condoned by successive generations of state antitakeover
statutes . . . .”). Compare Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 556 (Del. 1964) (effectively applying
the business judgment rule to takeover defenses), with Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493
A.2d 946, 955–56 (Del. 1985) (applying a more searching two-prong test for evaluating board use
of defensive tactics to fend off an unwelcome takeover bid).
425. Wells, supra note 66, at 584.
426. Kenneth K. Luce, Trends in Modern Corporation Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1291,
1298 (1952); see also Arsht, supra note 394, at 8 (“[T]he 1899 Act was largely silent with respect
to the standards to be adhered to by officers and directors in the performance of their duties . . . .”).
427. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 129, at 631.
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[corporate] law showed remarkable stability between 1896 and the
takeover wars of the 1980s, and that structure was determined in a
manifestly competitive environment,” referring with respect to the 1980s
to the introduction of anti-takeover legislation in that decade.428 William
Cary has similarly suggested that Delaware had “a modern and ‘liberal’
act” by 1915.429
These observations accord with historical patterns as measured by the
ADRI, ASDI, and CBR SPI: there was no dramatic erosion of shareholder
rights during the period analyzed, at least with respect to state law. Some
statutory amendments occurring in the 20th century did elicit strong
reactions. Nevertheless, Bratton and McCahery’s characterization of
20th-century rounds of innovation as “minor adjustments to a stable legal
regime” appears to be on the mark.430 Leximetric analysis indicates
changes to state law did not fundamentally compromise shareholder
rights after 1899.
If a substantial erosion of shareholder protection was not in fact a
hallmark of state corporate law in the United States from 1899 onwards,
was there ever a robust race to the bottom? To the extent it did happen,
the closing decades of the 19th century stand out as the crucial period. It
has been said that “American corporate law lost a substantial part of its
regulatory content from the 1880s”431 and that “the position of minority
shareholders in corporations if anything became weaker” as the 19th
century drew to a close.432 This Article leaves it to others to verify these
claims. From 1899 onwards, however, general trends concerning state
corporate law in the United States appear to accord with the empirical
findings that a “race” did not compromise fundamentally shareholder
rights under state corporate law.
CONCLUSION
Today, the general consensus is that U.S. law offers less robust
shareholder protection than other comparable countries’ laws. To the
extent this is the case, the pattern can be attributed most obviously to a
central and distinctive feature of U.S. corporate law, namely competition
between states for incorporation business stemming from the ability of
corporations to incorporate under the law of a state different from the one
in which they are headquartered. Although there has been acrimonious
debate over whether competition between states has produced a legal
428. Id. at 646.
429. Cary, supra note 11, at 664–65.
430. Bratton & McCahery, supra note 129, at 635.
431. P. M. Vasudev, Corporate Law and Its Efficiency: A Review of History, 50 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 237, 260 (2008–10).
432. Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Scylla or Charybdis? Historical Reflections on Two Basic
Problems of Corporate Governance, 83 BUS. HIST. REV. 9, 21 (2009).
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regime that disproportionately disempowers shareholders to managers’
benefit (and so been a “race to the bottom”) or instead has prodded states
to develop corporate law that enhances shareholder wealth (and so been
a “race to the top”), there has been general agreement that shareholder
rights have diminished over time. This Article has deployed empirical
analysis to discern how shareholder protection has evolved over time and
casts doubt on this received wisdom. In so doing, it has made three major
contributions to the literature on corporate law and shareholder
protection.
First, this Article presents a fresh way to track quantitatively the
development of U.S. corporation law over time. Using indices originally
developed to compare shareholder protections across nations, it charts the
development of three vital bodies of U.S. corporate law, those of
Delaware, Illinois, and the Model Business Corporation Act, since the
turn of the 20th century. The nature of these findings suggests
quantitative analysis of the development of corporate law over time could
be deployed effectively to provide insights in other contexts.
Second, the Article uses quantitative analysis to cast new light on the
nature of jurisdictional competition between states. Its deployment of
leximetric analysis indicates, for instance, that shareholder protections
offered by state law have eroded over the past century. This erosion was
generally modest, however, suggesting that if there was a meaningful race
to the bottom (or top), it did not occur from 1900 onwards.
This Article’s third and final significant contribution is to put into
context the federal government’s role in affording shareholders
protection. We have demonstrated quantitatively that federally-oriented
reform has considerably bolstered shareholder rights over time and
indeed has more than offset whatever diminution occurred due to state
law changes. Today’s shareholders, at least those in public corporations,
are better protected by the current amalgam of state and federal
“corporation law,” including stock exchange listing rules, than were
shareholders of a century or even a half-century ago. This Article
correspondingly shows that there has not been a steady erosion of
shareholder rights in the period under scrutiny, at least once the
significant effect of federal intervention is taken into account. Moreover,
the level of protection shareholders currently enjoy is reasonably high by
global standards.
For present purposes, this Article leaves open the normative
implications of the identified trends. This is because assessing the
desirability of shareholder protection is anything but straightforward.
While this Article indicates that shareholders were offered greater
protection overall over time, it is possible the costs of such additional
protection may have outweighed the benefits. Views expressed by those
in the “race-to-the-top” camp illustrate the point. Given that the “race-to-
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the-bottom” theory presupposes a sacrificing of shareholder rights in
favor of managerial flexibility, it might seem to follow that a “race to the
top” would imply fortification of shareholder rights. To the extent that
this is correct, “race-to-the-top” advocates seemingly should have
welcomed the federal interventions that pushed scores upward. Their
reaction in fact was largely the opposite.433 What they admire about state
corporate law, and dislike about federal corporate law, relates to choice
rather than content. As Judge Frank Easterbrook has observed, “States
can’t harm investors . . . . [I]f they make bad laws, capital migrates
elsewhere. . . . If Congress makes a mistake, it is not automatically
undercut by market forces.”434
The ADRI, ASDI, and CBR SPI do not purport to measure regulatory
style. Instead, they focus on the presence or absence of rules that can offer
protection to shareholders. Correspondingly, this Article’s historicallyoriented leximetric analysis does not provide an appropriate basis for
evaluating whether the sort of race that “race-to-the-top” advocates favor
has been a dominant feature of U.S. corporate law over time. More
broadly, this Article leaves it to others to assess the normative
implications of its findings. This Article provides an unprecedentedly rich
understanding of trends relating to shareholder protection that offers an
improved foundation for policy analysis.

433. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes–Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1529–43 (2005) (canvassing the empirical evidence
relating to four key changes SOX made); see also Larry E. Ribstein, Markets vs. Regulatory
Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1,
11–18, 57–61 (2002) (critiquing key SOX provisions and advocating state-led corporate law).
434. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race for the Bottom in Corporate Governance, 95 VA. L.
REV. 685, 698 (2009); accord Romano, supra note 20, at 216; see also Daniel R. Fischel, The
“Race to the Bottom” Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware’s Corporation
Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 921–22 (1982) (“In the context of the market for corporate charters,
this means that only states (such as Delaware) which have corporation laws that enable private
parties to maximize their joint welfare without undue regulatory interference will attract a high
percentage of incorporations.”).
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